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ABSTRACT 
With the spectrum of the range of military operations broadening, the operational 
tempo of Department of Defense assets has substantially increased. Military leaders must 
look to innovative solutions to meet the increased demands placed on the armed forces. 
Doctrine and policy such as the National Security Strategy, National Military Strategy 
and the Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support dictate the increased use of 
innovation and “jointness” by the military in order to meet the increasing demands of 
protecting the homeland. The question, “Are the U.S. Navy’s current procedures for 
responding to homeland defense and security tasking adequately designed?” needs to be 
addressed to ensure our nation is fulfilling its most essential duty: providing safety and 
security for its citizens. 
This thesis will discuss the establishment of NORTHCOM, analyze and detail the 
potential mission set the U.S. Navy can execute in homeland defense and security and 
examine the current command and control (C2) relationships that NORTHCOM has with 
the U.S. Navy compared to the other military services. The thesis will then provide 
alternate C2 options between NORTHCOM and the U.S. Navy as well as identify the 
advantages and disadvantages of those options and conclude with an analysis and 
recommendations. 
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A.  MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
Due to the spectrum of the range of military operations (ROMO) broadening, the 
operating tempo (OPTEMPO) of Department of Defense (DoD) assets substantially 
increases. In order to provide defense and security to the homeland, military leaders must 
look to innovative solutions as an effective and sensible response. Doctrine and policy in 
the forms of the National Security Strategy (NSS), National Military Strategy (NMS) and 
the Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support dictate the increased use of 
innovation and “jointness” by the military in order to meet the increasing demands of 
protecting the homeland. The question, “Are the U.S. Navy’s current procedures for 
responding to homeland defense and security tasking adequately designed?” needs to be 
addressed in order to ensure our nation’s military is fulfilling its most essential duty: 
providing safety and security for its citizens. 
B.  IMPORTANCE 
In addressing the question, “Are the U.S. Navy’s current procedures for 
responding to homeland defense and security tasking adequately designed?” one needs to 
understand the U.S. government’s current policy and strategy. The National Military 
Strategy derives its goals and objectives from the National Security Strategy. One of the 
NMS’s three priorities is transforming the military, and it states that the key principles for 
more effective joint operations are agility, decisiveness and decision superiority.1 Both 
the NMS and the National Strategy for Maritime Security (NSMS) identify the 




                                                 
1 Department of Defense, The National Military Strategy of the United States of America. Washington 
D.C., 2004. 
 2
discusses the growing concern for maritime domain awareness and the development of 
eight new plans that include: threat response, international outreach and coordination 
strategy, and a domestic outreach plan.2 
The NSMS explains the need for an effective, layered maritime security in order 
to properly address the increasing concerns and threats in the maritime realm. This 
includes terrorist and non-state threats, transnational criminal and piracy threats, and 
illegal seaborne immigration.3 The Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support 
also emphasizes the importance of innovation, joint warfare and the transformation of 
military capabilities and functions. It calls for a “strategy (that) requires an active, layered 
defense,”4 also known as defense in depth. This strategy focuses on the DoD in three 
roles; lead, support and enable. In the support role, one DoD mission is to “prevent, 
protect or recover from an attack or disaster.”5 Similar to the NSMS, the Strategy for 
Homeland Defense and Civil Support explains the importance of “balancing priorities 
due to scarce resources” and identifies goals in order to achieve better “jointness” 
through information sharing, increased intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance. 6 
These strategies as put forth by the government all act in concert with the identified need 
for defense in depth through a layered, joint force that is mobile and decisive as well as 
the need for innovation and transformation in order to ensure its success. 
This issue is important on multiple levels. Becoming more effective and efficient 
when using DoD assets in the prevention of, or recovery from, a disaster could save tax 
dollars over time, preserve democracy, save lives and minimize damage. As a public 
service, the DoD is obligated to continually assess its abilities and make improvements 
when and where possible. 
                                                 
2 Department of Defense, The National Strategy for Maritime Security. Washington D.C., 2005. 
3 Ibid. 




C.  PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESES 
In attempting to implement the previously mentioned strategies, the U.S. 
government has created Northern Command (NORTHCOM) as a unified command. 
NORTHCOM’s responsibility is stated as: “(to) conduct operations to deter, prevent, and 
defeat threats and aggression aimed at the United States…provide military assistance to 
civil authorities, including consequence management operations.”7 NORTHCOM is the 
first combatant command with homeland defense as its mission and the continental 
United States as its area of responsibility (AOR). NORTHCOM’s mission is to anticipate 
and conduct Homeland Defense and Civil Support operations within the assigned area of 
responsibility to defend, protect, and secure the United States and its interests.8 The U.S. 
Army, U.S. Air Force, and the U.S. Marine Corps all have service component commands 
that report directly to NORTHCOM. The U.S. Navy, however, has no component 
command, and instead contributes a supporting command—Fleet Forces Command. Fleet 
Forces Command does not report directly to NORTHCOM until directed to do so by U.S. 
Joint Forces Command (JFCOM).9 The vision and strategy provided by the U.S. 
government to integrate and use DoD assets for military support to civil authorities has 
been mirrored in the structure of NORTHCOM and its subordinate commands. The 
minor exception is the role the U.S. Navy plays within that command structure. It does 
not align with the strategy’s emphasis on integration and an increased joint ability. This 
thesis will argue that currently, the U.S. Navy is not maximizing its potential and 
capability to best support Northern Command in its mission to defend the homeland. 
While the U.S. Army, U.S. Air Force and the U.S. Marine Corps have established 
homeland defense support commands and have become more prepared through  
 
                                                 
7 Defense Science Board. DOD Roles and Missions in Homeland Security. Washington D.C.: Office of 
the Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, 2004. 
8 U.S. Northern Command, About U.S. Northern Command; available from 
http://www.northcom.mil/About/index.html. 
9 William Knight and Steve Bowman, Homeland Security: Evolving Roles and Missions for United 
States Northern Command. CRS Report for Congress. Washington D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 
2007. 
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restructuring, conducting exercises and liaising with their civilian counterpart, this thesis 
will argue that the U.S. Navy has fallen behind despite the tremendous capabilities it 
could bring to a variety of scenarios. 
D. LITERATURE REVIEW 
There are many military assistance to civil authorities missions including (but not 
limited to) responses to floods, enemy attacks, tsunamis, tornados, space debris impact, 
mass imigration, biological/radiological incident, oil spills, postal work stoppage, 
counter-drug operations, and counter-terrorism.10 These missions can be supported by the 
U.S. Navy through the supply of fixed and rotary-wing aircraft, transportation, shelter, 
food, medical support, security support, diver support, power generation, water transport, 
and communication support.11 One must ask why the U.S. Navy does not provide a 
service component command to directly support NORTHCOM in its day-to-day mission. 
The U.S. Navy does have the ability and ultimately, the tasking and mission to 
support NORTHCOM via the strategy and guidance provided from the President of the 
United States and the Secretary of Defense. With the continual transformation of the 
military, part of which is its new role in homeland defense, perhaps force levels and 
funding could be the explanation to the lack of the U.S. Navy involvement. 
In Hooker’s article, “Getting Transformation Right” he and his co-authors explain 
that effective transformation will expedite victories and reduce costs of military 
operations.12 Erckenbrack, author of “The DoD Role in Homeland Security,” agrees, 
suggesting that extra or additional funding is not what is required but a new way of 
thinking, for example not seeing the military as a whole but as a venue of assets and 
                                                 
10 Tonya M. Brickhouse, Homeland Defense: At Risk as a Result of Civil Support?  Research Report, 
Atlanta: Clark Atlanta University, 2003. 
11 Ibid. 
12 Richard Hooker Jr., H. R. McMaster, and Dave Grey, “Getting Transformation Right.” Joint Force 
Quarterly 38, 2005: 20–27. 
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capabilities.13 Meese’s article, “Organizing for Victory,” emphasizes the importance of 
the DHS implementing these changes in a “cost-effective manner.”14 
The Quadrennial Defense Review affirms the DoD as the largest bureaucracy in 
the world in terms of its budget. It clarifies the DoD’s new planning system grounded in 
capability versus anticipated threat, and refers to it as capability-based planning. A 
variety of skill-sets and identified capabilities will lead to a more integrated and effective 
transformation.15 Capability-based planning reduces any perceived cost influxes that may 
be associated with new DoD tasking. If properly managed, restructuring the 
organizational foundation of the DoD by focusing on capability would not create a heavy 
burden on the taxpayers. As the National Security Advisory Group points out, our 
military is under extreme strain and needs to balance its capabilities in order to minimize 
the negative impact of operating on multiple battlefronts.16 The necessary transformation 
of the military, with respect to civil support, can be done by identifying unique DoD 
capabilities. 
This is not a new mission. The U.S. military has “intervened in domestic affairs 
some 167 times…”17 The proper legislation has been in place to help reduce any “red 
tape” such as the Stafford Act which authorizes the use of the military for disaster relief, 
the Posse Comitatus Act, and the Insurrection Act.18 However, with the DoD’s expanding 
role in homeland defense and civil support, increased effectiveness and efficiency are 
necessary in order to be able to sustain the multiple levels of tasking. One of the 
challenges involved with this transformation is the organization for homeland security. 
                                                 
13 Adrian A. Erckenbrack and Aaron Scholer, “The DOD Role in Homeland Security.” Joint Force 
Quarterly 35, 2005: 34–41. 
14 Edwin Meese III, James Jay Carafano, Ph.D., and Richard Weitz, Ph.D. “Organizing for Victory: 
Proposals for Building a Regional Homeland Security Structure.” The Heritage Foundation, 2005: 1–7. 
15 Ryan Henry, “Defense Transformation and the 2005 Quadrennial Defense Review,” Parameters 35, 
2005: 5–15. 
16 National Security Advisory Group, The U.S. Military: Under Stress and at Risk. Washington D.C.: 
National Security Advisor Group, 2006. 
17 Mackubin Owens, “Fighters, Not First Responders,” The Weekly Standard, 2005: 28–31. 
18 Jennifer K. Elsea, “The Use of Federal Troops for Disaster Assistance: Legal Issues, CRS report for 
Congress, Washington D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 2005. 
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The federal government’s organizational structure in preventing, preparing and 
responding to natural and man-made disasters needs to be revamped for a more efficient 
and effective approach to homeland security.19 In Hillyard’s article, “Organizing for 
Homeland Defense,” he examines how the U.S. can increase its homeland defense 
efficiency through lessons learned from the DoD and operating and tasking through 
capability-based planning.20 Consider the USS Abraham Lincoln Carrier Strike Group’s 
response to the tsunami in 2004 where a U.S. Navy ship, USS Benfold (DDG 82), served 
as a floating gas station for aircraft and provided aid to victims while her crew was ashore 
conducting various manual labor-type jobs.21 This destroyer is designed for multiple 
missions, none of which is humanitarian assistance. This use of innovation is an example 
of capability-based training. The U.S. Navy’s performance following Hurricane Katrina 
also shows its immense capabilities. Seventeen ships were on station and treated over 
1,000 patients, conducted 380 evacuations, delivered 68,900 pounds of food and over 
110,000 pounds of fresh water, and provided more than 3,400 Seabees to clear roads, and 
to remove debris.22 This support, while massive, came later than it might have. On 
August 29, 2005, President Bush issued a federal declaration of emergency and on the 
following day Joint Task Force Katrina (JTF Katrina), established by NORTHCOM, 
declared Katrina an incident of national significance. While USS Bataan (LHD 5) arrived 
at New Orleans on the August 31, it was not until five days later that USS Iwo Jima 
(LHD 7), USS Harry S. Truman (CVN 75) and other naval assets arrived.23 Five days 
equates to massive unnecessary human suffering and exponential damage to critical 
infrastructure. Kochems, author of “Military Support to Civilian Authorities: An 
Assessment of the Response to Hurricane Katrina”, asserts, “(W)hile the Department of 
Defense (DoD) has an adequate response mechanism for normal disasters, it is not 
                                                 
19 Charles R. Wise, “Organizing for Homeland Security,” Public Administration Review, 2002: 131–
145. 
20 Michael J. Hillyard, “Organizing for Homeland Security,” Parameters, 2002: 75–86. 
21 James Pinsky, “Benfold’s benevolence: a tsunami relief story.” All Hands, 2005: 3–7. 
22 Katrina and the U.S. Navy; available from http://op-
for.com/2006/09/katrina_and_the_us_navy.html. 
23 Bowman, Steve and James Crowhurst, Homeland Security: Evolving Roles and Missions for United 
States Northern Command. CRS report for Congress, Washington D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 
2004. 
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adequately organized and prepared to respond to catastrophic disasters.”24 He further 
states, “Hurricane Katrina highlighted the absence of a comprehensive, all-hazards 
national system to respond to catastrophic events and the fact that the military is not 
properly configured to provide aid during such catastrophes.” 
The United States has defined its vision, with respect to homeland defense and 
civil support, passed the appropriate legislation, and developed the unified command post 
by the institution of NORTHCOM. The DoD has developed doctrine and incorporated 
capability-based planning in order to move forward with an “all-hazard approach.” The 
U.S. Navy has the responsibility to make a transformation and integrate itself within the 
DHS through NORTHCOM. It has been clearly demonstrated that it has the capability to 
not only address, but to succeed in multiple civil support missions. 
E. OVERVIEW  
Chapter II will discuss applicable laws and legislation, the establishment of 
NORTHCOM, and subsequently analyze and elaborate the potential mission set the U.S. 
Navy can carry out in the homeland defense and security role. Chapter III will look at the 
current command and control (C2) relationship with NORTHCOM and the armed forces, 
paying particular attention to the differences between the U.S. Navy compared to the 
other services. Chapter IV will look at various command and control options for U.S. 
Navy asset utilization in the homeland defense and security role as well as identify the 
advantages and disadvantages of those options. Chapter V will examine NORTHCOM’s 
maritime capability coupled with its likely increase in operations due to climate change 
and conclude with an analysis and recommendation of the options discussed in Chapter 
IV. 
 
                                                 
24Alan Kochems, Military Support to Civilian Authorities: An Assessment of the Response to 
Hurricane Katrina; available from http://www.heritage.org. 
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II. LAWS AND LEGISLATION, CREATION OF NORTHCOM 
AND THE U.S. NAVY’S CAPABILITIES TO ASSIST THE 
COMBATANT COMMANDER 
The Department of Defense is governed and guided by legislation, strategies, 
directives and regulations that define combatant commander roles and missions. A brief 
overview of this direction and guidance is required to understand how the newest 
regional combatant command, U.S. Northern Command, functions as it plans to meet its 
mission requirements and how its roles in both homeland defense and civil support are 
defined, supported, and regulated with regard to its participation in domestic events. This 
chapter will discuss the applicable laws and legislation that outline the Department of 
Defense role in Homeland Defense (HD) and Homeland Security (HS), followed by an 
introduction of U.S. Northern Command and its mission, and will conclude with a 
discussion of the capabilities of the U.S. Navy in support of the Northern Command 
mission. 
A. DIRECTIVES, LAWS AND LEGISLATION 
Homeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD)-5, Management of Domestic 
Incidents,25 
(A)ssigns the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security as the 
principal Federal official for domestic incident management to coordinate 
the Federal government’s resources utilized in response to, or recover 
from terrorist attacks, major disasters, or other emergencies.26  
HSPD-5 directs the Secretary of Defense to provide support to civil authorities for 




                                                 
25 Homeland Security Presidential Directive 5 was signed February 28, 2003. 
26 Joint Publication 3-28, Civil Support (September 2007), 128. 
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pending circumstances and legislation exist. HSPD-5 also directs the development of the 
National Response Framework (NRF) and National Incident Management System 
(NIMS).27 
HSPD-8, National Preparedness,28 establishes policies in order to improve and 
support the preparedness of the United States to prevent and respond to natural and man-
made disasters by “requiring a national domestic all-hazards preparedness goal, 
establishing mechanisms for improved delivery of federal preparedness assistance to state 
and local governments, and outlining actions to strengthen preparedness capabilities…”29 
The Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, which was 
signed into law November 23, 1988, “set the policy of the Federal government to provide 
an orderly and continuing means of…assistance to state and local governments…to 
alleviate the suffering and damage that results from…disaster.” and serves as the 
“primary legal authority for federal participation in domestic disaster relief.”30 This Act 
allows the DoD to intervene and take action in “three different scenarios: a Presidential 
declaration of a major disaster, a Presidential order to perform emergency work for the 
preservation of life and property, or a Presidential declaration of emergency.”31 
The Posse Comitatus Act (Title 18 U.S. Code, Section 1385) places restraints on 
the use of DoD personnel with respect to law enforcement. It specifically prohibits 
“interdiction of a vehicle, vessel, aircraft, or similar activities; and use of military 
personnel for surveillance or pursuit of individuals, or as undercover agents, informants, 
investigators, or interrogators” with the exception of “military purpose doctrine” and 
“indirect assistance,” which includes: 
 
                                                 
27 Department of Homeland Security, Homeland Security Presidential Directive 5: Management of 
Domestic Incidents; available from http://www.dhs.gov/xabout/laws/gc_1214592333605.shtm#1. 
28 Homeland Security Presidential Directive 8 was signed December 17, 2003. 
29 Department of Homeland Security, Homeland Security Presidential Directive 5: Management of 
Domestic Incidents; available from http://www.dhs.gov/xabout/laws/gc_1215444247124.shtm#1. 
30 Joint Publication 3-28, Civil Support (September 2007), 128. 
31 Ibid., 129. 
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(1) Actions that are taken for the primary purpose of furthering a military 
or foreign affairs function of the United States, (2). Federal Troops acting 
pursuant to the President’s Constitutional and statutory authority to 
respond to civil disorder, (3). Actions taken under express statutory 
authority to assist officials in executing the laws, subject to applicable 
limitations, (4). Counter-drug operations authorized by statute32 
Title 10 U.S. Code (Armed Forces) provides guidance on the use of the armed 
forces with respect to military law in general and branch specifics (U.S. Army, U.S. 
Navy, U.S. Marine Corps and the U.S. Air Force) and governs military support for 
civilian lead agencies.33 Most applicable to the homeland defense and security arena in 
Title 10 is chapter 15, The Enforcement of the Laws to Restore Public Order, formerly 
known as the Insurrection Act, which: 
Authorizes the President to employ the Armed Forces of the US, including 
the National Guard, within the United States to restore order or enforce 
federal law after a major public emergency…when requested by the state 
governor or when the President determines that the authorities of the state 
are incapable of maintaining public order.34 
Title 32 USC (National Guard) authorizes the use of federal funding to train 
National Guard personnel while they remain responsible to their respective state and is 
more commonly known for authorizing the President to use the National Guard to 
perform operations funded at the federal level (i.e. border security or counter-drug 
missions).35 
There are also a series of Department of Defense Instructions (DoDI) and 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instructions (CJCSI) that are applicable to the civil 
support mission including, Military Capabilities, Assets, and Units for Chemical, 
Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and High-Yield Explosive Consequence Management 
Operations; Standing Rules of Engagement/Standing Rules for the Use of Force for U.S. 
Forces; Military Assistance to Domestic Consequence Management Operations in 
                                                 
32 Joint Publication 3-28, Civil Support (September 2007), 129. 
33 Ibid., 129. 
34 Ibid., 53. 
35 Ibid., 130. 
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Response to a Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, or High-Yield Explosive 
Situation; and DoD Counterdrug Operational Support.36 
B. UNITED STATES NORTHERN COMMAND (USNORTHCOM) 
NORTHCOM was established October 1, 2002, to provide command and control 
of Department of Defense homeland defense efforts and to coordinate defense support of 
civil authorities.37 Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA), which was previously 
known as Military Assistance to Civil Authorities (MACA), is DoD support for domestic 
emergencies.38 DoD support includes anything from providing experts on chemical, 
biological, radiological, nuclear and high-yield explosives (CBRNE) to trained dogs (to 
smell and identify drugs, explosive materials and other items of interest) to amphibious 
helicopter assault ships (providing berthing, functioning flight deck and command and 
control functionality), all depending on the circumstances of the humanitarian 
assistance/disaster relief (HA/DR) mission assigned. Domestic emergencies include 
natural disasters such as wildland fires, tornadoes, earthquakes, floods, hurricanes, 
typhoons, cyclones, tidal waves, tsunamis, volcanic eruptions, landslides, mudslides, 
avalanches and blizzards, and also man-made disasters such as accidental or intentional 
releases of oil or other hazardous materials, power grid outages, terrorist attacks on 
critical infrastructure and virtually any other attack imaginable that could be carried out 
by enemies of the United States.39 
C. U.S. NAVY CAPABILITY IN THE DSCA ROLE 
The National Strategy for Maritime Security’s objectives is: Prevent Terrorist 
Attacks and Criminal or Hostile Acts, Protect Maritime-Related Population Centers and 
Critical Infrastructures, Minimize Damage and Recovery and Safeguard the Ocean and 
                                                 
36 DoDI and CJCSI 3000 and 4000 series available at http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives and 
http://www.dtic.mil/cjcs_directives/cjcs/instructions.htm. 
37 U.S. Northern Command, About U.S. Northern Command; available from 
http://www.northcom.mil/About/index.html.  
38 Department of Defense, Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support: 5. 
39 Joint Publication 3-28, Civil Support (September 2007), 52. 
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Its Resources.40 The third objective, Minimize Damage and Recovery, states: “The 
United States must be prepared to minimize damage and expedite recovery from a 
terrorist attack or other Incident of National Significance…”41 
DSCA is most applicable in the humanitarian assistance and disaster relief roles; 
the U.S. Navy can support this particular “mission set” drawing assets from the surface 
and aviation forces and from the navy’s new Navy Expeditionary Combat Command 
(NECC). 
1. Surface Forces 
For the scope of this thesis, surface forces will be limited to frigates (FFGs), 
destroyers (DDGs), cruisers (CGs), amphibious transport and landing ships (LSD/LPDs), 
amphibious helicopter assault ships (LHDs/LHAs) and aircraft carriers (CVNs). This is 
not to say that mine countermeasure ships, patrol craft and other naval surface forces 
cannot prove beneficial in the DSCA role in support of HA/DR, but that this thesis will 
focus on surface forces that have more regimented schedules due to increased capabilities 
which in turn makes them harder to obtain in the DSCA role. 
With HA/DR tasking, the combatant ships (FFGs, DDGs and CGs) share similar 
capabilities and limitations. All FFGs, CGs and some DDGs have the ability to embark 
rotary wing aircraft (SH-60 B/F/R) whose capabilities and limitations will be discussed 
later in this chapter. The DDGs that do not have the ability to embark helicopters, do 
have the ability to land and launch, conduct air control operations and refuel the aircraft. 
These ships can serve as refueling/berthing stations for the aircraft, which can bring their 
capabilities closer to the scene of a disaster.42 
                                                 
40 Department of Defense, The National Strategy for Maritime Security: 11 
41 Recovery is defined by the National Response Plan as the development, coordination, and execution 
of service- and site-restoration plans for impacted communities and the reconstitution of government 
operations and services. An Incident of National Significance is based on the criteria established in 
Homeland Security Presidential Directive-5, Management of Domestic Incidents, February 2003. 
42 DDGs 51-78 can support helicopter operations but cannot embark helicopter detachments. For more 
information see United States Navy Fact File; available from http://www.navy.mil/navydata. 
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These combatants also bring manpower. The Oliver Hazard Perry class frigate 
has a crew complement of over 200, the Arleigh Burke Destroyer Flight I/II class (27 in 
class) has over 345, the Arleigh Burke Destroyer Flight IIA class (30 in class) has over 
245 and the Ticonderoga class cruiser has over 355.43 U.S. Navy personnel can be sent 
ashore via the ships’ Rigid Hull Inflatable Boat (RHIB) and helicopters. Once ashore 
these personnel can be tasked as the on-scene commander (OSC) deems necessary. 
Besides delivering manpower through providing personnel, these ships can also deliver 
goods, such as water, food, medical supplies and generators. Through training, exercises 
and operations, these ships will develop new innovative ways to become even more 
capable in the HA/DR mission, as seen with USS Benfold (DDG 65) during the tsunami 
relief effort in Operation Unified Assistance.44 
In the HA/DR role, the amphibious ships: LSDs, LPDs, LHDs and LHAs (and for 
the similarities within the HA/DR mission CVNs will be included) provide similar 
capabilities to the cruisers, destroyers and frigates but with greater impact. The LSD and 
LPD are very similar in capability and mission tasking. The Whidbey Island class LSD 
has twelve ships in service and has a crew complement of over 400 and can carry up to an 
additional 420 troops that can serve as manpower for relief efforts or if troops are not 
embarked, the ship can berth and feed relief workers.45 Its well-deck can accommodate a 
variety of military lift vessels, including but not limited to, Landing Craft Air Cushions 
(LCACs), Landing Craft, Utility (LCUs) and Landing Craft, Mechanized (LCMs), all can 
be used to in shallow water to transport personnel and equipment.46 Its flight deck can 
conduct flight operations with its two embarked CH-53 Sea Stallions (as well as lighter 
rotary aircraft such as the SH-60s) and the ship can hold up to 90 tons of aviation fuel.47 
There are five San Antonio class LPDs in service and four under construction with the 
last scheduled to be delivered by 2012. This ship class has a crew complement of 360 and 
                                                 
43 Jane’s Information Group, Jane’s Fighting Ships 2006. Available from 
http://jfs.janes.com/public/jfs/index.shtml. 
44 Pinsky, “Benfolds benevolence: a tsunami relief story.” All Hands, 2005: 3–7. 




can carry an additional 720 troops.48 Its well deck can carry two LCACs and its flight 
deck can conduct flight operations identical to the Whidbey Island class with the addition 
of CH-46E Sea Knights and MV-22 Ospreys.49 The San Antonio class also has a 24 
medical-bed facility.50 The second class of LPDs is the Austin class, with five ships in 
service and a crew compliment of over 500 and berthing for over 800 troops.51 Its well 
deck can carry military lift vessels including two LCACs and fourteen Expeditionary 
Fighting Vehicles.52 It operates CH-46 Sea Knight helicopters as well as smaller rotary-
wing aircraft such as the Sea Hawk or Sea Cobra.53 The remaining ships in the Austin 
class have been refitted to accommodate a staff, creating additional berthing, briefing 
rooms and an enhanced communications ability including a video teleconference call 
(VTC) capability. 
There are two classes of amphibious helicopter assault ships in service, the 
Tarawa class and the Wasp class. Only two Tarawa class LHAs remain in service and 
their capabilities are similar to the Wasp class LHD.54 As the follow-on to the Tarawa 
class, the Wasp class, with eight ships in service, has a crew complement of over 1,100 
and can support an additional 1,800 troops. Its well decks can support up to three LCACs 
and the ship can hold over 1,200 tons of aviation fuel.55 The Wasp class has a 64 bed 
capacity hospital and six operating rooms which can be a significant resource in the 
HA/DR role.56 From its flight deck, it can launch and recover AV-8B Harriers, MV-22 
Osprey, F-35 Joint Strike Fighters, CH-46 Sea Knights, AH-1W Super Cobras, CH-53 
Super Stallions, UH-1N Twin Hueys, AH-1T Sea Cobras and SH-60 Seahawks.57 This 
                                                 









57 Initial procurement of the JSF and MV-22 for the U.S. Navy begins in fiscal year 2010. 
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ship class brings a robust capability to the HA/DR mission as seen in the aftermath of 
Hurricane Katrina, when the USS Bataan (LHD 5) provided a number of critical services 
to the disaster relief effort ranging from communications to basic berthing and feeding of 
federal, state and local responders. 
There are twelve aircraft carriers in service, eleven of them being of the Nimitz 
class.58 The Nimitz class has a crew complement of over 5,500 (including the aircrew).59 
From its flight deck, it can launch and recover F/A-18 Hornets, EA-6B Prowlers, E-2C 
Hawkeyes, C-2 Greyhounds, SH-60Fs, HH-60H and SH-60 Seahawks.60 The Nimitz 
class’s surgical suite, intensive care unit (ICU), medical ward (50 hospital beds), doctors 
(typically 6, one of which is a surgeon) and medical corpsmen gives it a robust medical 
capability able to provide care for casualties ranging from heat stress to heart attacks. Its 
engineering plant is capable of producing up to 400,000 gallons of fresh water per day.61 
The Nimitz also has an impressive communication suite that consists of several WCS-3A 
(UHF DAMA), WSC-6/8 (SHF), USC-38 (EHF) and SSR-2A Global Broadcast System 
(GBS).62 
2. Aviation Assets 
The U.S. Navy rotary and fixed-wing aircraft have different capabilities that make 
them beneficial in the HA/DR role. Rotary aircraft typically refers to helicopters but also 
includes rotary-tilt aircraft such as the MV-22 Osprey. In a HA/DR role, rotary aircraft 
                                                 
58 Jane’s Information Group, Jane’s Fighting Ships. 
59 Ibid. 
60 Ibid. 
61 Leveraging America’s Aircraft Carrier Capabilities: Exploring New Combat and Noncombat Roles 
and Missions for the U.S. Carrier Fleet; available from 
http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2006/RAND_MG448.pdf. It is estimated that the average citizen 
residing in an industrialized country uses 10 gallons of water for domestic use per day, source, Feiss, Paul 
and John James William Rogers, “People and the Earth,” Cambridge University Press, United States of 
America, 133. 
62 These transceivers permit communication via line of sight (LOS) as well as the use of satellites, 
making the Nimitz class communication suite robust and redundant. These transceivers not only permit 
voice transmissions and receptions but are also a key component of data links (GCCS-M, JMCIS, 
TADIXS, OTCIXS and JTIDS) by transmitting and receiving data, which in turn allows units to share text 
messages and build common operating pictures via real and near-real time updates of symbols representing 
anything from roads and railways to enemy ships and aircraft.  
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are extremely beneficial in preventing human suffering. Their ability to take-off and land 
vertically, and their ability to hover in a stationary space, allow them to reach people and 
places that traditional vehicles and fixed-wing aircraft cannot. 
The SH-60 Seahawk variants (B, F and R) have the ability to land and launch on 
all of the naval surface forces that were discussed above. The SH-60 is a twin-engine, 
medium lift aircraft, equipped with a communication suite that permits voice transmit and 
receive ability on Ultra-High Frequency (UHF) and High-Frequency (HF).63 The SH-60 
has an external cargo hook with a 6,000 lb capacity and a rescue hoist with a 600 lb 
capacity.64 The external cargo hook capability allows the SH-60 the ability to provide 
medicine, food and water to people in hard to access areas and the rescue hoist affords 
the SH-60 the ability to conduct rescue missions and medical evacuations (MEDEVACs). 
The SH-60 can also be outfitted with extra fuel tanks to increase flight time. Depending 
on the variant, the SH-60 can also conduct personnel transfers of up to eight 
passengers.65 
The MH-53 Sea Dragon has the same general maneuverability advantages of the 
SH-60 with the exception of landing on the combatant surface vessels. However, the 
MH-53 can transport up to 55 personnel or transfer up to 32,000 lbs of cargo.66 The 
heavy lifting ability of the MH-53 significantly increases the value of having this 
particular asset in a HA/DR role. MV-22 Osprey procurement (48 for the U.S. Navy) is 
expected to begin in the 2010-2012 timeframe.67 The rotary-tilt aircraft is a multi-
mission, vertical take-off and landing (VTOL) asset that can transport “up to 24 combat-
equipped troops…up to 12 litters plus medical attendants; or a 9,070 kg (20,000 lb) cargo 
load…external cargo carried by single and dual cargo hooks, with capability of lifting 
4,500 kg (9,921 lb) and 6,800 kg (14,991 lb) respectively.”68 
                                                 








U.S. Navy fixed-wing aircraft that could contribute to a HA/DR mission include 
the C-2A Greyhound and the P-8 Multi-mission Maritime Aircraft (MMA), Poseidon.69 
The C-2A Greyhound is used for Carrier On-board Delivery (COD) and can transport 28 
passengers or 12 medical litters and attendants or up to 10,000 lbs in freight.70 The U.S. 
Navy is procuring over 100 land-based P-8 Poseidons, and expects to reach full-rate 
production in 2012.71 The P-8 has an advanced communication suite and has a range of 
over 1,200 nautical miles with an on station time of four hours.72 
With the exception of the C-2A Greyhound, all the U.S. Navy aircraft discussed 
can operate using night-vision goggles and act as a communication relay platform, 
extending the range and thereby the effectiveness of C2.73 These aircraft are also able to 
incorporate some variant of a forward-looking infra-red (FLIR) system; using thermal-
imagery in recovery efforts could help locate citizens in danger thereby increasing 
success rates for SAR missions.74 These aircraft are also outfitted with equipment 
designed for military missions that could prove useful with innovation as DSCA assets in 
the HA/DR role. For example, the SH-60B is equipped with the Magnetic Anomaly 
Detector (MAD), which detects magnetic variation underwater. It is designed to locate 
submerged submarines, however if the aircraft is being used for disaster relief MAD 
could be used to locate large submersed “debris” that may be impeding recovery efforts 
or even causing more damage. This is only one example, there are other systems, such as 
RADAR and dipping SONAR that with imagination and increased experienced might 
prove to have additional uses that could increase the effectiveness of equipment not 
necessarily designed for the HA/DR role. 
 
                                                 
69 The P-8 MMA Poseidon has an introduction operational capability dated for 2013. United States 
Navy Fact File; available from http://www.navy.mil/navydata. 






3. Navy Expeditionary Combat Command 
In January 2006, the U.S. Navy established a new command - the Navy 
Expeditionary Combat Command. The NECC mission is to “organize, man, train, equip 
and maintain Navy expeditionary forces to meet the maritime security operations and 
joint contingency operations requirements” and be a “Global force provider of adaptive 
force, packages of naval expeditionary capabilities to warfighting commanders” in order 
to “extend maritime battlespace.”75 The missions of the NECC include “effective 
waterborne and ashore anti-terrorism force protection; theater security cooperation and 
engagement; and humanitarian assistance and disaster relief.”76 The capabilities within 
the NECC to carry out these missions include: Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD), 
Riverine, Naval Construction, Maritime Civil Affairs (MCA), Expeditionary Intelligence, 
Maritime Expeditionary Security, Expeditionary Diving and Salvage, Expeditionary 
Logistics, Expeditionary Training and Combat Camera. 
Explosive Ordinance Disposal teams are trained in CBRNE threats and are the 
“only military EOD force that can both parachute from the air to reach distant targets or 
dive under the sea to disarm weapons” and EOD’s “Mobile Diving and Salvage Units 
clear harbors of navigation hazards, engage in underwater search and recovery 
operations, and perform limited underwater repair on ships.”77 EOD’s ability to conduct 
controlled demolitions coupled with their extensive mobility make them a valuable asset 
in the HA/DR role. 
NECC’s Riverine and Maritime Expeditionary Security forces are composed of 
several small surface vessels that have a tactically insignificant draft, allowing these 
vessels access to a flooded urban environment to conduct basic SAR missions. Their 
ability to gain this access also provides the capability to develop and maintain situational 
awareness in a disaster area providing the on-scene commander valuable information. 
                                                 




Navy divers from the Expeditionary Diving and Salvage command can conduct 
“expeditionary salvage, search and recovery…, perform harbor clearance…, underwater 
cutting and welding, and limited demolition” and are also capable of, “construction, 
inspection and repair of ocean facilities such as wharves, piers, underwater pipelines, 
moorings and boat ramps.”78 These particular capabilities could prove useful in an array 
of disaster relief scenarios. 
The Naval Construction command, more commonly referred to as “Seabees,” 
have a unique capability in that they are a self-sufficient force (Seabees provide their own 
logistic and security needs) capable of construction on roads, bridges, bunkers, airfields - 
all of which are vital to the critical infrastructure of the United States.79 The Naval 
Construction Force is comprised of: (1) Naval Construction Regiments (NCRs) that are 
capable of responsive, quality construction and disaster recovery in support of HA/DR, 
(2) Naval Mobile Construction Battalions (NMCBs) are trained and proficient with wood, 
steel, masonry and concrete construction and can also conduct specialized construction 
from battle damage repair to water well drilling, (3) Naval Amphibious Construction 
Battalions (ACBs) can transport equipment and materials through the use of barges and 
ferries and are able to construct floating piers, install fueling systems and build camps 
capable of housing 1300 personnel and (4) Underwater Construction Teams (UCTs), 
capable of inspecting and/or repairing maritime infrastructure; wharves, piers, underwater 
pipelines and moorings.80 
The Navy Expeditionary Logistics Support Group (NAVELSG) is a scalable and 
flexible support force trained in conducting, “port and air cargo handling missions, 
customs inspections, contingency contracting capabilities, fuels distribution, freight 
terminal and warehouse operations, postal services, and ordnance reporting and 
handling.”81 In a DSCA role and HA/DR mission, NAVELSG could lead or coordinate  
 
                                                 
78 Navy Expeditionary Combat Command; available from http://www.necc.navy.mil. 
79 U.S. Naval Construction Force; available from https://www.seabee.navy.mil. 
80 Ibid. 
81 Navy Expeditionary Combat Command; available from http://www.necc.navy.mil. 
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with local agencies with its previously mentioned capabilities. The Maritime Civil Affairs 
command would oversee the integration between local and/or state efforts with 
NAVELSG and other NECC commands. 
4. DSCA Utilization 
DSCA is typically part of the recovery efforts as seen with HA/DR missions. 
NORTHCOM can (and has) accelerated recovery time and decreased casualties caused 
by the aftermath of a natural disaster by leveraging DoD capabilities as seen with 
Hurricane Katrina disaster relief efforts. The U.S. Navy provided transportation, medical 
support, food, water, shelter, SAR efforts and communication in support of relief efforts 
using surface forces, aviation assets and the Navy Expeditionary Combat Command. This 
effort resulted in the medical treatment of over 1,000 patients, over 380 evacuations, over 
68,000 lbs of food and over 110,000 lbs of potable water delivered and over 3,400 
Seabees that helped preserve and repair critical infrastructure.82 Response to Hurricane 
Katrina from the U.S. Navy clearly demonstrates its capability with a HA/DR mission as 
a DoD asset supporting civil authorities.83 
Natural disasters such as Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, the Northridge earthquake, 
and the 2008 Mississippi River floods, and man-made disasters such as the Minneapolis 
I-35 bridge collapse, the Anthrax threat, and the events on 9/11, all threatened the United 
States and required an extensive HA/DR response. The U.S. Navy’s role in support of 
recovery efforts has been discussed above. However NORTHCOM’s mission is two-fold; 
Defense Support to Civil Authorities and provide command and control of Department of 
Defense homeland defense efforts. 
 
                                                 
82 Katrina and the U.S. Navy; available from http://op-
for.com/2006/09/katrina_and_the_us_navy.html. 
83 Among those assets were USS Bataan (LHD 5), USS Truman (CVN 75), USS Iwo Jima (LHD 7), 
USS Whidbey Island (LSD 41), USS Arctic (T-AOE 8) USS Grapple (ARS 53), USNS Mercy (T-AH 19) 
and USNS Comfort (T-AH 20). 
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D. U.S. NAVY CAPABILITY IN THE HOMELAND DEFENSE ROLE 
Defending the homeland in the traditional sense has been the major role of the 
U.S. Navy since its inception. The U.S. Navy capability in homeland defense from a less 
traditional aspect needs to be explored. While the range of military operations will most 
likely continue to expand, innovation, efficiency and effectiveness within the military 
force is paramount in defending the homeland. The following missions, while more 
conventional in nature, have not been fully utilized or incorporated with respect to 
homeland defense. The U.S. Navy’s sea-based ballistic missile defense (BMD), maritime 
interception operations (MIO) and maritime domain awareness (MDA) missions can and 
must be integrated into NORTHCOM’s homeland defense mission. 
1. Sea-Based Ballistic Missile Defense 
As an integrated and joint approach to BMD, the DoD continues to modify DDGs 
and CGs to accommodate this complex and challenging mission. Aegis DDGs and CGs 
are distinct from other warships because of their Aegis weapon systems that are 
comprised of: The SPY-1 RADAR, a multi-functional, phased-array RADAR designed to 
detect, track and provide missile guidance for intercept missiles; a suite of computers that 
run fire-control and battle-management software; and the standard missile (SM), which 
serves as the U.S. Navy’s primary surface-to-air missile (SAM).84 
Currently, there are 21 BMD capable AEGIS ships in the fleet and the proposed 
defense budget for 2010 calls for six more ships receiving the necessary software 
upgrade.85 The Aegis BMD midcourse system is currently configured and “designed to 
detect and track ballistic missiles of any range, including ICBMs, and intercept short- and 
medium-range ballistic missiles…above the atmosphere…during their midcourse phase 
of flight.” When BMD ships are used in the capacity of detecting and tracking ICBMs, 
                                                 
84 Thomas O’Rourke, “Sea-Based Ballistic Missile Defense –Background and Issues for Congress,” 
Congressional Research Service, 20 July 2009. For more on the AEGIS system and its principal 
components as originally deployed, see CRS Report 84–180, The AEGIS Anti-Air Warfare System: Its 
Principal Components, Its Installation on the CG-47 and DDG-51 Class Ships, and its Effectiveness, by 
Ronald O’Rourke. (October 24, 1984) This report is out of print and is available directly from the author. 
85 Ibid., 2. The proposed 2010 defense budget also requests $168.7 million USD for procurement of 
the required SM-3 that works in concert with the AEGIS software upgrade. 
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they provide fire-control quality data to the integrated U.S. BMD architecture.86 Besides 
the Aegis BMD midcourse system, BMD ships also serve the capability referred to as the 
“sea-based terminal capability” that provides a sea-based capability “for intercepting 
(theater ballistic missiles) in the final, or descent, phase of flight, after the missiles have 
reentered the atmosphere, so as to provide local-area defense of U.S. ships as well as 
friendly forces, ports, airfields, and other critical assets ashore.”87 This particular feature 
of the BMD capability provides defense in depth and could prove useful in protecting the 
homeland closer to the shores of the United States. The ability to integrate within the U.S. 
BMD architecture coupled with the mobility of sea-based BMD assets expands the 
capability and range to protect the United States from ballistic missiles.88 The current 
U.S. Navy record of accomplishment with successful BMD intercepts as of July 31, 
2009, is 18 out of 22.89 U.S. Navy officials expect that as time passes and resources and 
experience continues to grow, both the U.S. Navy BMD capability and performance will 
improve, furthering overall BMD effectiveness for the United States. 
2. Maritime Interception Operations 
Another U.S. Navy capability that is traditionally practiced in waters far from the 
shores of the United States is maritime interception operations. Maritime interception 
operations consist of intercepting a sea-going vessel and if necessary boarding, searching 
and possibly seizing. These operations are typically conducted in the search of illegal 
cargo such as drugs, slaves, weapons of mass destruction and for intelligence gathering 
through crew interviews and reviewing of vessel documents. The vast majority of U.S. 
                                                 
86 O’Rourke, “Sea-Based Ballistic Missile Defense –Background and Issues for Congress,”  3. 
87 Ibid., 9, 10. 
88 “TBMs include, in ascending order of range, short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs), which 
generally fly up to about 600 kilometers (about 324 nautical miles), medium-range ballistic missiles 
(MRBMs), which generally fly up to about 1,300 kilometers (about 702 nm), and intermediate-range 
ballistic missiles (IRBMs), which generally fly up to about 5,500 kilometers (about 2,970 nm). 
Intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) are longer-ranged missiles that can fly 10,000 kilometers (about 
5,400 nm) or more. Although ICBMs can be used to attack targets within their own military theater, they 
are not referred to as TBMs.” O’Rourke, Thomas. “Sea-Based Ballistic Missile Defense –Background and 
Issues for Congress,” Congressional Research Service, 20 July 2009. 
89 Ibid., 1 and Navy Times; available from 
http://www.navytimes.com/news/2009/07/navy_DN073109_AegisBMD_web. 
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Navy ships are capable of conducting maritime interception operations. This mission can 
be a contingency operation or a planned operation working in concert with a U.S. Coast 
Guard detachment or from a singular combatant and its Non-Compliant Boarding capable 
Visit, Board, Search and Seizure (NCB-VBSS) team. The NCB-VBSS team consists of 
twelve to eighteen crewmembers that are trained to verify ship’s documents, bills of 
lading, and crew manifests and to search for contraband (especially in hidden 
compartments and/or tanks). They are also trained to conduct interrogations that include 
the use of biometric equipment that makes significant contributions to multiple 
intelligence and law enforcement databases; and if necessary, through the ship’s master, 
the NCB-VBSS team can reposition the ship to a designated location for further 
processing. 
NCB-VBSS teams and riverine and coastal security units from NECC all provide 
the MIO capability that can be not only employed around the world, but also off the coast 
of the United States, and complements an assortment of maritime homeland defense 
(MHD) and maritime homeland security (MHS) missions. 
3. Maritime Domain Awareness 
Today’s maritime domain is susceptible to a variety of threats, including but not 
limited to nation-states, terrorists, transnational criminals and pirates. The maritime 
domain is defined as: 
All areas and things of, on, under, relating to, adjacent to, or bordering on 
a sea, ocean, or other navigable waterway, including maritime-related 
activities, infrastructure, people, cargo, and vessels and other 
conveyances90 
Maritime domain awareness is the “effective understanding of anything 
associated with the maritime domain that could impact the security, safety, economy, or 
environment of a nation.”91 The knowledge of a specific merchant vessel, its flag, port of 
origin and cargo onboard and final destination is an example of MDA. The National 
                                                 
90 Department of Defense, The National Strategy for Maritime Security. 
91 Joint Publication 1–02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms 
(August 2009), 331. 
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Strategy for Maritime Security is a strategy designed to meet the standards laid out in the 
National Security Strategy. The NSMS states, “More than 80 percent of the world’s trade 
travels by water and forges a global maritime link. About half the world’s trade by value, 
and 90 percent of the general cargo, are transported in containers” and further states, 
“(There) are 30 megaports/cities that constitute the world’s primary, independent trading 
web…(and a) handful of international straits and canals pass 75 percent of the world’s 
maritime trade and half its daily oil consumption.”92 These staggering numbers help 
illustrate the significance of providing security to the maritime domain and the challenges 
within the mission of maintaining maritime domain awareness. 
The maritime domain offers a new means to transport WMD or other various 
threats and contraband.93 The probability of a hostile state using WMD is expected to 
increase during the next decade.94 Such an attack, however, does not necessarily have to 
be conducted by a hostile state; it could be conducted by state-sponsored terrorists. 
Delivery of a WMD to the U.S. would most likely occur via the maritime domain 
because of the opportunity to remain undetected that the sea lanes of communication 
offer and the current lack of security throughout the waters. 
The maritime domain offers an opportunity for terrorists: 
Today’s terrorists are increasing their effectiveness and reach by 
establishing links with other like-minded organizations around the globe. 
Some terrorist groups have used shipping as a means of conveyance for 
positioning their agents, logistical support, and generating revenue. 
Terrorists have also taken advantage of criminal smuggling networks to 
circumvent border security measures95 
Terrorists are wise to exploit weaknesses in maritime security when and where they exist. 
Terrorist capabilities are adapting to this relatively new battlespace: 
 
                                                 
92 Department of Defense, The National Strategy for Maritime Security. 
93 An alternative danger is that a foreign state will provide critical advanced conventional weaponry, 
WMD components, delivery systems and related materials, technologies, and weapons expertise to another 
rogue state or a terrorist organization that is willing to conduct WMD attacks, Department of Defense, The 
National Strategy for Maritime Security. 
94 National Intelligence Council. Mapping the Global Future. Washington D.C.: 2004. 
95 Department of Defense, The National Strategy for Maritime Security. 
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Terrorists…develop effective attack capabilities…using a variety of 
platforms, including explosives-laden suicide boats and light aircraft; 
merchant and cruise ships as kinetic weapons to ram another vessel, 
warship, port facility, or offshore platform; commercial vessels as launch 
platforms for missile attacks; underwater swimmers to infiltrate ports; and 
unmanned underwater explosive delivery vehicles96 
The large number of merchant shipping vessels around the world, coupled with 
the enormous size of the oceans, provides terrorists with a wide range of opportunities for 
exploitation ranging from illegal seaborne immigration to WMD placement. The key to 
all of these opportunities is the maritime domain: terrorists have identified this domain as 
one of the United States’ greatest vulnerabilities, and they are learning how to best 
exploit it. 
The transnational criminal and piracy threat poses challenges similar to those 
posed by terrorists. Smuggling people, drugs, and weapons, as well as acts of piracy and 
armed robbery against vessels, pose a threat to maritime security.97 Just as the oceans 
have provided a lucrative avenue for commerce, they have, at the same time, afforded 
increased opportunity to illegal activities. Maritime drug trafficking generates vast 
amounts of money for international organized crime syndicates and terrorist 
organizations.98 This revenue can be used for a variety of purposes, such as terrorist 
financing or even WMD purchases. Drug money, especially on the international level, 
can further challenge and complicate the complexity of tracing the funds. 
With increasing border security, the susceptible coastline offers a safer alternative 
for illegal immigration, referred to as “illegal seaborne immigration.” Illegal seaborne 
immigration is an emerging threat that needs attention in the early, more developmental 
stage before it evolves into a problem with a solution that is exponential more difficult as 
time goes on. The NSMS states, “International migration is a long-standing issue that will 
remain a major challenge to regional stability, and it will be one of the most important 
                                                 
96 Department of Defense, The National Strategy for Maritime Security. 
97 Ibid. 
98 Ibid. On October 14, 2009, USS Anzio (CG 68) seized four tons of hashish onboard a small vessel 
off the coast of Oman with a street value of roughly 28 million dollars. 
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factors affecting maritime security through the next ten years.”99 With a world-wide 
economic crisis, instability and political unrest will increase, thereby increasing illegal 
seaborne immigration.100 As legislation (i.e., terrorist watch lists) and technology (i.e., 
biometrics) improve, terrorists may look to illegal seaborne immigration as a more 
effective means to achieve their goals. 
One NSMS objective is to protect maritime-related populated centers, critical 
infrastructure, key resources, transportation systems, borders, harbors, ports, and coastal 
approaches in the maritime domain.101 Critical infrastructure is defined by the USA 
PATRIOT Act as: 
Systems and assets, whether physical or virtual, so vital to the United 
States that the incapacity or destruction of such systems and assets would 
have a debilitating impact on security, national economic security, 
national public health or safety, or any combination of those matters.102 
Nuclear power plants, oil refineries, levees, passenger terminals, fuel tanks, 
pipelines, chemical plants, tunnels, cargo terminals and bridges are all common attributes 
to ports and can be considered as critical infrastructure.103 Ports are also very susceptible 
and vulnerable to attacks because they are “sprawling, easily accessible by water and 
land, close to crowded metropolitan areas, and interwoven with complex transportation 
networks.”104 Port security is a responsibility shared by the public and private sector but 
ultimately the DHS is the lead agency charged with the responsibility to protect and 
defend the nation’s critical infrastructure and key resources.105 
                                                 
99Department of Defense, The National Strategy for Maritime Security. 
100 Ibid. 
101 Ibid. 
102 USA PATRIOT Act, 2001; available from http://www.fincen.gov/statutes_regs/patriot 




The NSMS identifies five strategic actions to meet its objectives. These are to 
enhance international cooperation, maximize domain awareness, embed security into 
commercial practices, deploy layered security and assure continuity of the marine 
transportation system. 
The NSMS identifies these five strategic actions as imperative in order to achieve 
its objectives. Maritime security is a complex mission that requires effort from multiple 
sources. The NSMS states, “Maritime security is best achieved by blending public and 
private maritime security activities on a global scale into a comprehensive, integrated 
effort that addresses all maritime threats.”106 It further states that: 
Maritime security crosses disciplines, builds upon current and future 
efforts, and depends on scalable layers of security to prevent a single point 
of failure…coordination, cooperation, and intelligence and information 
sharing…are required to protect and secure the maritime domain.107 
Involving the public and private sector, coupled with coordination, cooperation 
and intelligence/information sharing, demonstrates the complexity involved with 
providing security to the maritime domain. The NSMS acknowledges that the five 
strategic actions are not single solutions but are multiple, necessary actions that 
complement each other. Of these five strategic actions, MDA has a heightened 
significance; the NSMS identifies domain awareness as the critical enabler for all of the 
strategic actions.108 
Awareness within all domains, air, land, sea, space and cyberspace is required in 
order to assure safety and security for the United States.109 Not only is gathering and 
processing information to build an effective MDA essential, but also “knowledge of an 
adversary’s capabilities, intentions, methods, objectives, goals, ideology 
…structure…(and) behavior” are required to best assess and address issues that exist 
                                                 





within the maritime domain.110 Effective MDA provides time, a vital commodity in any 
warfighters arsenal. The ability to identify a potential threat prior to having effective 
weapons release range affords authorities the opportunity to confirm the identity and/or 
intentions of the threat through further analysis and also allows time to decide for the best 
possible solution for the threat, whether it be interception, boarding and/or elimination. 
The NSMS states, “Such knowledge is essential to supporting decision-making for 
planning, identifying requirements, prioritizing resource allocation, and implementing 
maritime security operations.”111 The knowledge referenced from the NSMS is the 
product of an effective MDA. 
The U.S. Coast Guard’s approach to MDA is the Nationwide Automatic 
Identification System (AIS) Project via providing vessel identification and tracking 
capabilities to support maritime domain awareness.112 The AIS Project was developed in 
response to the requirements of the Maritime Transportation Security Act, emerging 
homeland security requirements, and the ongoing need to improve vessel traffic services 
(VTS).113 AIS is “(A)n international standard for ship-to-ship, ship-to-shore, and shore-
to-ship communication of information, including vessel identity, position, speed, course, 
destination and other data.”114 Figure 1 helps show how the U.S. Coast Guard is utilizing 
multiple resources in support of building and maintaining a MDA. 
                                                 
110 Department of Defense, The National Strategy for Maritime Security. 
111 Ibid. 





Figure 1.   Nationwide AIS System.115 
Nationwide Automatic Identification System uses a very high frequency (VHF) 
data link to transmit and receive data from AIS equipped vessels, navigation aids and 
search and rescue aircraft and leverage other platforms as receive only units, such as 
satellites, buoys and aircraft.116 The International Maritime Organization requires all 
vessels over three hundred tons to be equipped with AIS. 
Maritime domain awareness is a challenging complex and evolving issue that 
requires attention, concern and effort from joint, interagency and multinational members 
in order to address the overwhelming threats in the maritime domain. The U.S. Navy has 
been and continues to increase the quantity and quality of MDA, particularly far from the 
shores of the United States in more common operating areas. The U.S. Navy could be 
developing and building a more effective MDA in concert with the USCG in support of 
maritime HS and HD. 
                                                 
115 United States Coast Guard, Nationwide Automatic Identification System Project. 
116 Ibid. 
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III. COMMAND AND CONTROL (C2) RELATIONSHIPS 
BETWEEN NORTHCOM AND THE ARMED FORCES 
The current command and control relationship between NORTHCOM and the 
U.S. Navy will be examined in this chapter. This discussion will include the complexity 
of the current structure, clarification of key terms and a comparison of the command and 
control relationships of the other branches of the military. 
Joint Publication 1-02, The Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and 
Associated Terms, defines command and control as: 
The exercise of authority and direction by a properly designated 
commander over assigned and attached forces in the accomplishment of 
the mission. Command and control functions are performed through an 
arrangement of personnel, equipment, communications, facilities, and 
procedures employed by a commander in planning, directing, 
coordinating, and controlling forces and operations in the accomplishment 
of the mission.117 
NORTHCOM has C2 over joint forces, joint task forces and some service components. 
Joint Publication 3-27, Homeland Defense, identifies six subordinate commands: Joint 
Task Force Civil Support (JTF-CS), Joint Task Force North (JTF North), Standing Joint 




                                                 
117 Joint Publication 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms 
(August 2009), 103. 
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North (MARFORNORTH).118 The U.S. Navy is the only service component that does 
not provide a subordinate command but a supporting command; the U.S. Fleet Forces 
Command (USFF) (see Figure 2).119  
 
Figure 2.   NORTHCOM Command Relationships.120 
                                                 
118 “JTF Alaska’s mission is to, in coordination with other government agencies, deter, detect, prevent 
and defeat threats within the Alaska Joint Operations Area (AK JOA) in order to protect U.S. territory, 
citizens, and interests, and as directed, conduct Civil Support. Joint Force Headquarters National Capital 
Region (JFHQ-NCR), based at Fort McNair, Washington, D.C. is responsible for land-based (HD), 
(DSCA) and incident management in the National Capital Region. U.S. Northern Command Standing Joint 
Force Headquarters’ mission is to provide Commander, USNORTHCOM with the scalable capability to 
form the core of a Joint Task Force or to augment multiple organizations in order to anticipate and conduct 
Homeland Defense and Civil Support missions anywhere in the USNORTHCOM Area of Responsibility 
during planned or crisis operations.” U.S. Northern Command, About U.S. Northern Command; available 
from http://www.northcom.mil/About/index.html. 
119 Joint Publication 1-02 defines subordinate command as, “A command consisting of the 
commander and all those individuals, units, detachments, organizations, or installations that have been 
placed under the command by the authority establishing the subordinate command” (emphasis added by 
author), 528. 
120 Figure 2 available in Joint Publication 3-27, Homeland Defense (July 2007), II–5. 
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A.  JOINT FORCE COMMANDERS 
NORTHCOM’s area of responsibility “includes air, land and sea approaches and 
encompasses the continental United States, Alaska, Canada, Mexico and the surrounding 
water out to approximately 500 nautical miles.”121 As a geographic combatant 
commander, NORTHCOM’s command structure consequently has three functional 
component commanders under its operational control (OPCON) for mission 
accomplishment in its AOR: joint force land component commander (JFLCC), joint force 
air component commander (JFACC) and joint force maritime component commander 
(JFMCC).122 
1. Joint Force Land Component Commander 
Joint Publication 3-31, Command and Control for Joint Land Operations, defines 
a joint force land component commander as: 
The commander within a unified command, subordinate unified command, 
or joint task force responsible to the establishing commander for making 
recommendations on the proper employment of assigned, attached, and/or 
made available for tasking land forces; planning and coordinating land 
operations; or accomplishing such operational missions as may be 
assigned. The (JFLCC) is given the authority necessary to accomplish 
missions and tasks assigned by the establishing commander.123 
NORTHCOM’s joint force land component commander is the Army’s Service 
Component Command (ASCC), U.S. Army North. ARNORTH defines its role as “The 
Joint Land Force Component Command (JFLCC) and the Army Service Component 
Command (ASCC) to U.S. Northern Command.” Within that role, ARNORTH “conducts  
 
 
                                                 
121 U.S. Northern Command, About U.S. Northern Command; available from 
http://www.northcom.mil/About/index.html. NORTHCOM’s AOR also includes the Gulf of Mexico and 
the Straits of Florida. 
122 Joint Publication 3-33, Joint Task Force Headquarters (February 2007), defines joint force 
commander as a general term applied to a combatant commander, subunified commander, or joint task 
force commander authorized to exercise combatant command (command authority) or operational control 
over a joint force. GL-14. 
123 Joint Publication 3-31, Command and Control for Joint Land Operation (March 2004), GL-10. 
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Homeland Defense (HD), Civil Support (CS) operations and Theater Security 
Cooperation (TSC) activities in order to protect the American people and our way of 
life.”124 
In October 2008, ARNORTH was given command of Third Infantry Division’s 
(3rd ID) First Brigade Combat Team (1st BCT) specifically to accomplish assigned 
JFLCC duties. 1st BCT has been referred to as a response force that: 
(I)s (a) scalable, dedicated force that is prepared to reinforce state and 
local responders when they request federal assistance. The force’s 
alignment under U.S. NORTHCOM shortens the line of command to 
increase readiness and responsiveness.125 
 
1st BCT units consist of: 3rd Battalion 69th Armor Regiment, 2nd Battalion 7th Infantry 
Regiment, 5th Squadron 7th U.S. Cavalry, 1st Battalion 41st Field Artillery, 1-3 Brigade 
Special Troops Battalion and the 3rd Brigade Support Battalion.126  
2. Joint Force Air Component Commander 
Joint Publication 3-30, Command and Control for Joint Air Operations, defines a 
joint force air component commander as: 
The commander within a unified command, subordinate unified command, 
or joint task force responsible to the establishing commander for making 
recommendations on the proper employment of assigned, attached, and/or 
made available for tasking air forces; planning and coordinating air 
operations; or accomplishing such operational missions as may be 
assigned. The (JFACC) is given the authority necessary to accomplish 
missions and tasks assigned by the establishing commander.127 
                                                 
124 United States Army North, Mission; available from http://www.arnorth.army.mil/. Joint 
Publication 1-02 defines Army Service Component Command as “Command responsible for 
recommendations to the joint force commander on the allocation and employment of Army forces within a 
combatant command. 
125Consequence Management Response Force to join Army Northern Command September 15, 2008; 
available from http://www.army.mil/-news/2008/09/15/12422-consequence-management-response-force-
to-join-army-northern-command/. 
126 Third Infantry Division; available from http://www.stewart.army.mil/units/1BCT/home.asp. 
127  Joint Publication 3-30 Command and Control for Joint Air Operations (June 2003), GL-6. 
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AFNORTH serves as the JFACC, subordinate to NORTHCOM. AFNORTH is 
responsible for ensuring air superiority (including air sovereignty and defense) of the 
United States and conducts homeland defense and DSCA operations under 
NORTHCOM.128 
AFNORTH has over 2,300 personnel assigned and when United States Theater 
Air Control System (USTACS) is mobilized grows to over 11,000 members and consists 
of over 180 aircraft. AFNORTH’s assets include as many as 30 Air National Guard 
fighter wings, nine aligned air force fighter wings, the 101st Information Operations 
Flight, Air Force Rescue Coordination Center (AFRCC), 601st Air and Space Operations 
Center (AOC), 1st AF National Security Emergency Preparedness (AFNSEP), Joint 
Based Expeditionary Connectivity Center (JBECC), 702nd Computer Systems Squadron 
and Support Facility and the 254th Combat Communications Group.129 The U.S. Air 
Force clearly has a wide array of various commands dedicated to complete myriad of 
missions assigned. 
3. Joint Forces Maritime Component Commander 
Joint Publication 3-32, Command and Control for Joint Maritime Operations, 
defines a joint force maritime component commander as: 
The commander within a unified command, subordinate unified command, 
or joint task force responsible to the establishing commander for making 
recommendations on the proper employment of assigned, attached, and/or 
made available for tasking maritime forces and assets; planning and 
coordinating maritime operations; or accomplishing such operational 
missions as may be assigned. The (JFMCC) is given authority necessary to 
accomplish missions and tasks assigned by the establishing command.130 
 
NORTHCOM’s JFMCC is Naval Forces Northern Command (NAVNORTH), which also 
serves as Commander Atlantic Fleet (CLF) and U.S. Fleet Forces Command, meaning 
                                                 
128CONR-1AF (AFNORTH); available from 
http://www.1af.acc.af.mil/library/factsheets/factsheet.asp?id=4107. 
129 CONR-1AF (AFNORTH).. Aligned fighter wings: 119th, 120th, 125th, 142nd, 144th, 147th, 148th, 
158th and the 177th. 
130 Join Publication 3-32 Command and Control for Joint Maritime Operations (August 2006), GL-9. 
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that USFF wears “three hats.” USFF has four missions: Navy Readiness, Navy Anti-
Terrorism/Force Protection (ATFP), Navy Warfighting Capability Requirements and 
Joint Operational and Planning Support.131 Of USFF’s identified four missions, only one 
involves supporting NORTHCOM: “Joint Operational and Planning Support” which is 
defined as, “(To) provide operational planning and support to Combatant Commanders.” 
This vague definition of a broad mission, allows USFF latitude to determine how it will 
fill the role of NAVNORTH. Unlike AFNORTH and ARNORTH, NAVNORTH does 
not have dedicated assets to support tasking from NORTHCOM. Because U.S. Fleet 
Forces Command is subordinate to multiple combatant commanders, it may find that a 
series of incidents requiring naval support may very well overwhelm their capacity to 
effectively manage all tasks (see Figure 3).132 USFF is the naval component commander 
to JFCOM and is the supporting naval commander to NORTHCOM, STRATCOM and 
the National Security Agency (NSA).133 It is of significance to note that NORTHCOM’s 
official Web site identifies USFF only as a subordinate command.134  
                                                 
131 United States Fleet Forces 2009 Annual Plan, A Framework for Action 2009. 
132 United States Fleet Forces 2009 Annual Plan, A Framework for Action 2009. 8. 
133 Ibid., 8, 9. As a component command to JFCOM, USFF is a subordinate command. As a 
supporting command to NORTHCOM, STRATCOM and the NSA, USFF determines the forces, tactics, 
methods, procedures, and communications to be employed in providing the support (Joint Publication 1-
02). 




Figure 3.   USFF Command Relationships. 
Unity of command is a principle of joint operations “to ensure unity of effort 
under one responsible commander for every objective.”135 A common, fundamental and 
crucial attribute in any military organization is a clear chain-of-command. The military is 
not designed to function within ambiguous command and control arrangements and it 
appears this may be the case with respect to the relationship between NORTHCOM and 
USFF. One approach to this argument may be that NORTHCOM places a lower priority 
on threats in the maritime domain. However, General Renuart, commander of 
NORTHCOM, states: 
                                                 
135 Joint Publication 3-0, Joint Operations (February 2008), A-2. 
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In any given month, our Command tracks… (and) takes appropriate 
measures to ensure these potential threats do not reach our shores: 40 
foreign flag vessels with potential for intelligence gathering, 25 vessels of 
interest to law enforcement (potential contraband), 8 foreign nation 
warships entering USNORTHCOM’s AOR, 100 regulatory vessels 
(containing hazardous materials or other dangerous cargo) and 7 vessels of 
interest to our national security.136 
Based on the general’s statement coupled with previous statements and objectives 
provided from multiple strategies it appears that marginalizing the maritime threat is not 
a contributor to an ambiguous command and control relationship between NORTHCOM 
and USFF. NORTHCOM’s standing execute order (EXORD) for DSCA may help further 
the argument that there is ambiguity within the command structure. The DSCA EXORD 
identifies six phases (Shape, Anticipate, Respond, Operate, Stabilize and Enable Civil 
Authorities) and defines the required status (deploy or place on alert) for assets under the 
joint force commander’s OPCON based and structured on four categories (category 1 
being most ready for tasking with category 4, the least ready). Section three (execution) 
of the EXORD defines tasks for each subordinate command, one of which is USFF, 
which further illustrates the ambiguity of whether USFF is a subordinate or supporting 
command to NORTHCOM. USFF, acting as the Commander Atlantic Fleet, has OPCON 
of all naval assets in the Second Fleet, that is to say it commands, directs and tasks all 
naval assets in the Second Fleet operating area.137 However, USFF does not have 
OPCON of Third Fleet assets.138 Third Fleet assets are assigned forces under 
Commander Third Fleet’s (C3F) OPCON who, operationally reports to Commander U.S. 
Pacific Fleet and subsequently to the unified command, U.S. Pacific Command 
                                                 
136 Statement of General Victor E. Renuart, Jr. USAF before the Senate Armed Services Committee. 
March 6, 2008. 
137 Joint Publication 1-02 defines OPCON as, “Command authority that may be exercised by 
commanders at any echelon at or below the level of combatant command. Operational control is inherent in 
combatant command (command authority) and may be delegated within the command. Operational control 
is the authority to perform those functions of command over subordinate forces involving organizing and 
employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction 
necessary to accomplish the mission. In respect to NORTHCOM’s AOR, C2F’s AOR overlaps on the 
Eastern coast of North America. 
138 USFF does have administrative control (ADCON) of Third Fleet assets. 
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(PACOM).139 NORTHCOM’s EXORD does have an execution subsection titled, 
“TASKS TO SUPPORTING COMBATANT COMMANDS.” In this section, JFCOM 
and PACOM are separately and specifically instructed as to what their responsibilities in 
support of this EXORD consist of.140 NORTHCOM clarifies needs and expectations for 
JFCOM and PACOM in order to ensure cooperation and support by the respective Fleet 
Commanders.141 
B. CONCLUSION 
U.S. Navy assets in Third Fleet under PACOM’s operational control could 
suggest that USFF, as the JFMCC, may not have the legitimate, or the necessary, 
command and control of these assets to effectively and efficiently support NORTHCOM 
with a well-executed and timely response. 
In joint publications and on NORTHCOM’s official Web site and its DSCA 
EXORD, the relationship between NORTHCOM and its naval component (JFMCC, 
NAVNORTH and USFF), and in particular whether it is in a subordinate or supporting 
role, appears to be at minimum confusing. This would lead a reasonable person to believe 
that if there are inconsistencies between joint publications and NORTHCOM’s Web site 
and EXORD then there will most likely be confusion once these forces are called into 
action when responding to a crisis. When immediate response is required in support of 
civil authorities, naval forces can little afford to spend time determining command 
relationships. 
Beyond the ambiguous C2 and the role of the U.S. Navy, one should also look at 
the U.S. Navy’s commitment in contrast to the other service components. The U.S. Army 
and U.S. Air Force have commands established (ARNORTH and AFNORTH) with the 
                                                 
139 USPACOM’s AOR overlaps with NORTHCOM’s AOR on the Western coast of North America. 
140 NORTHCOM’s DSCA EXORD tasks to CDRUSJFCOM and CDRUSPACOM include: When 
requested…identify pre-approved category 2 or category 3 DSCA forces and provide 
CDRUSNORTHCOM via USNORTHCOM command center the following information: Unit Designation, 
Unit Identification Code (UIC), Home Station Unit, 24 hour contact information for the specific 
unit/capability, GCCS (data link) input; for more see NORTHCOM DSCA EXORD. 
141 For amplifying information regarding requirements see CJCS Standing DSCA EXORD and DoD 
Directives 3025.1 and 3025.15. 
 40
sole purpose and a clear mission to support NORTHCOM and both have dedicated assets 
allowing them to be immediate and effective contributors to the NORTHCOM mission. 
However, the U.S. Navy treats this support mission as a contingency mission and has 
assigned NAVNORTH as an additional duty to USFF which already has multiple 
missions and lacks OPCON of U.S. Navy assets in the Third Fleet AOR. NAVNORTH 
being treated as an additional and collateral duty for USFF coupled with the fact that 
there are no dedicated U.S. Navy assets to support NORTHCOM tasking suggests that 




IV. NORTHCOM COMMAND AND CONTROL ALTERNATIVES 
FOR U.S. NAVAL FORCES 
Chapter II discussed the establishment and missions of NORTHCOM and the 
U.S. Navy capabilities that exist to best support the COCOM. Chapter III illustrated the 
current C2 relationship between NORTHCOM and the U.S. Navy and the ambiguity that 
lies within that construct. This chapter examines alternative options on how the U.S. 
Navy can best support NORTHCOM in carrying out their missions as well as the 
associated advantages and disadvantages of those options. The options to be examined 
are (from least to most drastic changes): Option A: Additional mission requirement, 
Option B: Forces assigned to NORTHCOM, Option C: Homeland Defense and Security 
Group, Option D: National Security Cutter acquisition and Option E: Restructure surface 
forces. 
A. OPTION A: ADDITIONAL MISSION REQUIREMENT 
The additional mission requirement would entail surface ships in the U.S. Navy 
becoming “HS certified.” Each ship, based on class, would have specific criteria to meet 
in order to achieve and maintain HS certification. The HS certification would become 
another mission requirement governed by the Surface Forces Training Manual (SFTM).  
The mission for Naval Surface Forces Command is to “(P)rovide operational 
commanders with well trained, highly effective, and technologically relevant Surface 
Forces that are certified across the full spectrum of warfare areas.”142 Commander Naval 
Surface Forces (COMNAVSURFOR) maintains and distributes the SFTM. This manual 
“(P)rovides guidance for the conduct of Surface Force unit level training for all ships and 
units of the Naval Surface Force.”143 The SFTM defines the criteria and requirements for 
U.S. Navy surface ships based on ship class; Figure 4 depicts the required unit-level 
                                                 
142 CNSF Mission Statement; available from 
http://www.surfaceforces.surfor.navy.mil/site%20pages/Mission.aspx. Commander, Naval Surface Forces 
is a Type Commander subordinate to USFF. 
143 COMNAVSURFOR INSTRUCTION 3502.1D, Department of the Navy, 01 July 2007:1. 
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certifications of each class of ship.144 This certification criterion varies on each mission 
depending on the ship class. For example, a destroyer has to meet more requirements in 
order to certify for surface warfare than does an amphibious ship. 
 
Figure 4.   Unit Level Certifications. 
                                                 
144 Because ships have different missions and thereby have different capabilities, requirements vary 
from class to class. For example, a DDG and CG have to be proficient in the strike mission, whereas this is 
non-applicable for an amphibious ship. These requirements are constantly monitored and are effected from 
equipment casualties to failing certifications. Figure 4 available in SFTM: 3–3. 
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The additional mission requirement would need to be defined and have certain 
certification requirements developed. This equates to adding HS to the certification 
criteria in the SFTM. The new criteria would follow the same format as the other existing 
certifications. Combatant ships would be required to have their entire crews advanced 
first aid qualified in order to better support the HA/DR mission. The U.S. Navy currently 
has medical training requirements in place such as CPR and basic first aid for all crew 
members and more advanced training and certification for personnel with unique 
responsibilities, such as members of an at-sea fire party. While most commanding 
officers encourage crew members to pursue qualifications above the minimum required, 
the HS certification would raise that minimum making advanced first aid qualification a 
mandatory requirement for all crewmembers.  
Amphibious ships would have the same advanced first aid requirement in addition 
to a non-combatant evacuation operation (NEO) capability geared specifically towards 
domestic HA/DR. The functions would be similar to those in NEO; the HS certification 
would have requirements that include running periodic drills that demonstrate the ability 
to provide shelter and basic health care to a predetermined number of evacuees, 
comparable to a NEO. Joint Publication 3-68, Noncombatant Evacuation Operations 
defines NEO as: 
Operations directed by the Department of state or other appropriate 
authority, in conjunction with the (DoD), whereby noncombatants are 
evacuated from foreign countries when their lives are endangered by war, 
civil unrest, or natural disaster to safe havens or the United States.145  
Because NEO is more often conducted due to political reasons (war and civil 
unrest), the ambassador of the country having American citizens evacuated is afforded 
certain indicators that a NEO may be necessary and will typically “drawdown and then 
evacuate.” If the environment permits, an evacuation control center (ECC) that is 
responsible for the processing, screening and logistical functions in support of the 
evacuees will be established on land. However, if this is not an option then the U.S. Navy 
                                                 
145 Joint Publication 3-68, Noncombatant Evacuation Operations (January 2007), GL-7. 
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ship operating in support of a NEO must be prepared to establish an ECC.146 Because the 
U.S. Navy ship is a secondary option and an unlikely location for the ECC most NEO 
training scenarios and drills place the ECC on shore, however; in a domestic HA/DR 
operation that may require similar functions of a NEO; the ECC would almost be 
guaranteed to be onboard the ship. 
The HS certification on an amphibious ship would include passing a graded drill 
that involves a scenario where the ship establishes an ECC and conducts evacuation 
operations in support of HA/DR. This particular example only serves to show how the 
SFTM could incorporate a HS certification by using drills and training. As with all 
certifications listed in the SFTM, the HS certification would evolve over time through 
training, real-world operations and lessons learned. 
1. Advantages 
Implementing a HS certification requirement in the SFTM would require the 
surface fleet to accept the HS certification as an operational requirement, thereby 
improving the U.S. Navy’s abilities to contribute to NORTHCOM’s civil support 
mission. Another advantage of this option is that it does not place a significant additional 
burden on the ships, most importantly, the overworked combatants. Having the ships’ 
crews certify in first aid requires very little additional effort and also increases the 
relative value of each member onboard and could help alleviate stress placed on the 
handful of hospital corpsmen onboard in particular situations. In the case of amphibious 
ships, the mission aligns with their NEO capability and would only make them more 
proficient with one of their existing missions. The last advantage to this option is that the 
HS certification can be applied on a global level; ships required to certify in HS could 
easily apply those skills and capabilities to relief efforts across the globe. 
                                                 
146 Joint Publication 3-68, Noncombatant Evacuation Operations. 
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2. Disadvantages 
One could argue that this is not enough change; ambiguity with the C2 
relationship between NORTHCOM and USFF is still not resolved, so a HS certified ship 
in port would remain in port until directed to support NORTHCOM via its fleet 
commander. Another disadvantage is that this option increases training and reporting 
requirements on a navy arguably already administratively overburdened. 
B. OPTION B: FORCES ASSIGNED TO NORTHCOM 
Although NORTHCOM is a geographical COCOM with an AOR it does not have 
U.S. Navy assets “chop in” or “chop out.” Typically, as U.S. Navy ships crosses into 
different AORs, their OPCON shifts to the respective COCOM. That is to say that as 
USS Example leaves the Pacific Ocean and enters the Indian Ocean there are specific 
geographic coordinates where OPCON shifts from PACOM to Central Command 
(CENTCOM); USS Example has “chopped in” to Commander Fifth Fleet’s area of 
operations. To best illustrate this option, PACOM will serve as an example: Commander, 
Third Fleet and Commander, Seventh Fleet (C7F) report to U.S. Pacific Fleet, which is 
the navy service component of PACOM.147 This option proposes that NORTHCOM 
assumes OPCON of surface assets in NORTHCOM’s AOR. Commander, U.S. Pacific 
Fleet would operationally report to NORTHCOM concerning Third Fleet assets in 
NORTHCOM’s AOR. The same principle would be applied on the east coast. In other 
words, the U.S. Navy would have forces from Second Fleet assigned to NORTHCOM.148 
1. Advantages 
If NORTHCOM has forces assigned then by definition they exercise OPCON 
over those forces. Having OPCON of naval assets in its AOR would streamline the chain-
                                                 
147 U.S. Pacific Fleet, U.S. Pacific Fleet Organization (accessed October 3, 2009); available from 
http://www.cpf.navy.mil/organization.shtml. 
148 Joint Publication 5-0 Joint Operation Planning defines assigned forces as, “Combatant 
commanders exercise combatant command (command authority) over assigned forces. Forces are assigned 
or reassigned when the transfer of forces will be permanent or for an unknown period of time, or when the 
broadest level of command authority is required or desired.” 
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of-command thereby significantly decreasing response time. This process would not only 
reduce the number of commands involved in a NORTHCOM mission, but would also 
alleviate any conflicts of interests between COCOMs. There would be no ambiguity 
when determining who is required to do what and by whose request. U.S. Navy and 
NORTHCOM direct interaction would significantly increase and in turn build a more 
effective and efficient relationship. 
2. Disadvantages 
A change of this magnitude could receive a lot of pushback from naval 
traditionalists as well as anyone not comfortable with change. This option would require 
a minor shift in cultural behaviors. Again using the west coast as an example; U.S. 
Pacific Fleet reports to PACOM on operational matters. This particular option requires 
that U.S. Pacific Fleet report to PACOM and NORTHCOM. Currently, U.S. Pacific Fleet 
does not identify NORTHCOM as “force user”; U.S. Pacific Fleet identifies itself as a 
force provider for PACOM, CENTCOM, STRATCOM, EUCOM and SOCOM.149 This 
further illustrates the lack of a clearly defined supported/supporting relationship between 
U.S. Pacific Fleet and NORTHCOM. In addition, this could suggest that if U.S. Pacific 
Fleet does not even acknowledge NORTHCOM as a force user it may struggle to 
consider itself as a subordinate command if designated as one. 
C. OPTION C: HOMELAND DEFENSE AND SECURITY GROUP (HDSG) 
The U.S. Navy conducts the majority of its operations using carrier strike groups 
and expeditionary strike groups (ESGs). For simplicity the CSG will serve as a 
comparative example to illustrate the idea of the HDSG. The navy instruction on the 
policy for composition and mission capabilities of strike forces, strike groups, and other 
major deployable elements defines a typical CSG composition to be one carrier strike 
group command staff/element, one destroyer squadron command staff/element, one 
CV/CVN, one carrier air wing, five surface combatants, one cruise missile land 
                                                 
149 U.S. Pacific Fleet, U.S. Pacific Fleet Organization; available from 
http://www.cpf.navy.mil/organization.shtml. 
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attack/undersea warfare submarine (SSN) and one or two multi-product logistic support 
ships.150 The HDSG would follow a similar construct using capability-based planning in 
concert with the U.S. Navy’s fleet response plan (FRP). 
An HDSG would consist of identified U.S. Navy ships and aircraft assigned a 
mission set to include: humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, maritime interception 
operations, undersea warfare (USW), counter-narcoterrorism operations, counter-piracy 
operations and ballistic missile defense. 
Navy management calls for expanding the ability of carrier and expeditionary 
strike groups by identifying points in time during a training cycle where a ship could be 
considered deployable and available for tasking. USFF has implemented the FRP that 
complements and coincides with the proposed HDSG concept. The FRP is a 
transformation in management of fleet assets. Prior to September 11, 2001, the U. S. 
Navy deployed ships and aircraft squadrons with a designated carrier for a nominal 
period of six months which followed a “work-up cycle” consisting of ship qualifications, 
certifications and crew readiness with the intent of having ships deploy upon obtaining 
the highest practical level of readiness available. Upon returning from a deployment, a 
ship would have a brief stand-down, a 30-day period to allow the crew the opportunity to 
take leave. Following the completion of the stand-down, the ship would then enter a 
maintenance phase for repairs or major routine maintenance. For example, Aegis 
destroyers and cruisers conduct periodic system grooms where civilian technicians come 
on board the warship and run diagnostic tests, install new software and troubleshoot or 
repair hardware and software related casualties starting from the most significant down to 
minute cosmetic details. This Aegis groom is a required maintenance action assigned a 
specific periodicity that requires the ship to be in port. Due to the nature of the 
maintenance, the ship’s ability to get underway is reduced and for this particular 
example, the ship’s air warfare certification is no longer valid eliminating its ability to 
launch standard missiles and consequently not allowing the ship to conduct air warfare 
                                                 
150 OPNAV Instruction –3501.316A. –Policy for composition and mission capabilities of strike forces, 
strike groups, and other major deployable elements. 6 September 2007. Of note, there are no longer any 
CVs remaining in the active U.S. Fleet. 
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operations. After the maintenance period the ship and her crew began the work-up cycle 
in preparation for another deployment. This training period consisted of the “unit-level 
phase” followed by the “integrated phase” and lastly, the “sustainment phase.” 
Following the terrorists attacks on September 11, 2001 the U.S. Navy 
incorporated the idea of ships being “surge ready” or operationally deployable based on 
the ship’s level of readiness in relation to the ship’s progression within the training cycle 
(see Figure 5). Ships in the unit-level phase are considered surge-ready to deploy within 
90 days while ships in the sustainment phase are surge-ready to deploy within 30 days. 
The FRP also introduced a three-month sustainment period following deployment 
prior to the maintenance phase. The U.S. Navy can modify its surge capability schedule 
in order to incorporate the HDSG by introducing a third category of surge ready ships 
capable of deploying within little to no notice in response to homeland defense and 
security tasking. Ships would be attached to a HDSG during the sustainment period 
following deployment. 
As a force assigned to NORTHCOM, the HDSG would develop and maintain 
new, positive and long-lasting relationships with other homeland defense and security 
agencies at the federal, regional and local level.151 These relationships would build social 
networks through communications that would allow the U.S. Navy to be a more proactive 
and effective player in the homeland defense and security arena and include the naval 
forces in more homeland defense and security exercises while increasing the U.S. Navy’s 





                                                 
151 Joint Publication 5-0, Joint Operation Planning defines assigned forces as, “Combatant 
commanders exercise combatant command (command authority) over assigned forces. Forces are assigned 
or reassigned when the transfer of forces will be permanent or for an unknown period of time, or when the 
broadest level of command authority is required or desired. Assigned forces are listed in the Forces for 
Unified Command Memorandum or as the SecDef designates. A force assigned to a combatant command 
may be transferred from that command only as directed by the SecDef.  
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Figure 5.   Fleet Response Plan.152 
This option would establish two HDSGs. One HDSG would be composed of four 
ships from the Pacific Fleet and the other would have three ships from the Atlantic Fleet. 
Each HDSG will be assigned one rotary-wing aircraft and one fixed-wing patrol aircraft 
(Either a P-3, P-8 or E-2). The HDSG program would identify ships returning from 
deployment and following post-deployment stand-down, shift their OPCON to 
NORTHCOM during the previously discussed sustainment period (prior to the 
maintenance phase) making the HDSG an assigned force. 
Two HDSGs would be developed, one on each coast that utilizes assets already 
stationed in that geographical area of responsibility. HDSG-1 would utilize Pacific Fleet 
assets and its headquarters would be based out of Naval Station, San Diego. In addition to 
                                                 
152 United States Government Accountability Office, Military Readiness: Navy’s Fleet Response Plan 
Would Benefit from a Comprehensive Management Approach and Rigorous Testing. November 2005: 8. 
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two aircraft and a shore detachment, HDSG-1 would consist of three combatant ships 
(DDG, CG and/or a FFG) and one amphibious ship, either a dock landing ship (LSD), 
amphibious transport dock (LPD), or an amphibious assault ship (LHA/LHD).153 All 
Pacific Fleet amphibious ships are stationed at Naval Station, San Diego. Ships for 
HDSG-1 would be designated from assets homeported in various naval stations such as 
San Diego, Pearl Harbor and Everett.154  
The makeup of HDSG-2 would be consistent with HDSG-1 minus one combatant. 
Its assets would be provided from the Atlantic Fleet and its headquarters would be based 
out of Naval Station, Norfolk. Ships in HDSG-2 would be designated from assets 
homeported in the east coast naval stations, Mayport, Little Creek and Norfolk.155 
Due to the inherent mobility of military aircraft and their ability to refuel once on 
station, there is no need to constrain them to a specific location, only to require them to 
be on station within 24 hours. The aircraft only need to be an apportioned force in the 
appropriate HDSG.156 
Each HDSG would have a shore detachment that would act as a support unit, an 
experienced “resident expert” and act in a supervisory role. A shore detachment would be 
made up of one mid-grade and one junior commissioned officer, one senior enlisted 
personnel and a small enlisted staff for administrative work. Because the personnel 
assigned to the shore detachment would not have a turnover rate as high as the ships that 
rotate through the HDSGs, the shore detachment would become more experienced 
through lessons learned and gradually evolve into subject matter experts on how the 
HDSGs operate, what is expected of them and what they can expect in the way of 
tasking. The shore detachment will be charged with assisting in the turnover process for 
                                                 
153 From this point forward, the term amphibious ship will be defined as a LSD, LPD, LHA or LHD 
unless otherwise specified. 
154 Naval Station Everett is located in Everett, Washington, 25 miles north of Seattle. 
155 Naval Station Mayport is located in Jacksonville, Florida and Naval Station Little Creek is located 
in Virginia Beach, Virginia. 
156 Joint Publication 5-0, Joint Operation Planning, defines apportionment as, “Apportionment is the 
distribution for planning of limited resources among competing requirements. Specific apportionments 
(such as air sorties and forces for planning) are described as apportionment of air sorties and forces for 
planning, and so forth,” 198.  
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ships joining and leaving the HDSG. The detachment will brief ships on their duties and 
responsibilities as a member of the HDSG, on lessons learned from off-going HDSG 
ships and about upcoming events and exercises to ensure a smooth transition when a 
ship’s OPCON shifts to NORTHCOM. 
The shore detachment will also create professional relationships with local, state 
and regional counterparts that will increase proficiency and foster an interagency 
network. These relationships will help the evolution of the HDSGs. Increased 
participation in NORTHCOM exercises would increase HDSGs future performance by 
obtaining accurate self-assessments, using lessons-learned and would also serve to 
improve interagency relations. The shore detachments would be responsible for the 
oversight and management of “strategic stockpiles” located on station at Naval Station, 
San Diego and Naval Station, Norfolk. The strategic stockpile would consist of items 
most likely needed in the humanitarian assistance/disaster relief mission such as 
generators, medical kits, clothing, tents, water and food. These items will be ready to be 
distributed to ships within a moment’s notice based on humanitarian assistance/disaster 
relief tasking. 
1. Advantages 
As an assigned force to NORTHCOM, the HDSG would have an optimum 
response time due to the clear and quick communication required in that C2 relationship. 
HDSG’s shore detachment would build bridges with other HS/HD organizations and 
agencies and over time would integrate itself within the HS/HD construct at the federal, 
state and local levels ultimately becoming a reliable and dependable broker of the 
capabilities that the U.S. Navy brings in support of mission accomplishment. This option 
not only provides NORTHCOM with assigned naval forces but also has the ships only 
operating within the HS role, thereby encouraging ships to focus less on traditional naval 




The range of military operations and increasing tempo of those operations has 
placed a significant strain on U.S. Navy assets over the years. “Surge ready” ships have 
been getting underway more and more and the fleet definition of surge ready is slowly 
becoming synonymous with deploying. Increased use and reliance on surge ready ships 
could make the HDSG another burden for U.S. Navy planners and/or personnel. 
D. OPTION D: NATIONAL SECURITY CUTTER ACQUISITION 
Due to the approaching end of the life cycles of the Oliver Hazard Perry Class 
Guided-Missile Frigate, Avenger MCM-1 Mine-Countermeasure ship, Hamilton Class 
High-Endurance Cutter, Bear Class Medium-Endurance Cutter and Reliance Class 
Medium-Endurance Cutter; the U.S. Navy and U.S. Coast Guard are both in the process 
of acquiring new small combatant vessels.157 The U.S. Navy has responded to this 
problem with the production of the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) and the U.S. Coast Guard 
responded by budgeting for six Legend Class high-endurance cutters commonly referred 
to as “National Security Cutters (NSCs).”158  
The LCS applies a new concept that entails having the ship act as a shell and 
loading modules based on the mission.159 The LCS has three different modules that make 
it mission capable for surface warfare, undersea warfare and countermine warfare 
operations. A Congressional Budget Office’s report, Options for Combining the Navy’s 
and the Coast Guard’s Small Combatant Programs states, “the Navy may develop and 
                                                 
157 The U.S. Coast Guard’s Deepwater program is intended to obtain assets that can operate further 
than 50 nautical miles from U.S. shores where the waters are more rough on ships. A Cooperative Strategy 
for 21st Century Seapower calls on the U.S. Navy to play a larger role in maritime security and 
humanitarian operations. 
158 The U.S. Navy’s 2009 shipbuilding plan calls for the production of 53 LCSs between 2009 and 
2019; source, Congressional Budget Office, “Options for Combining the Navy’s and the Coast Guard’s 
Small Combatant Programs,” July 2009: 7. 
159 The LCS is currently available in two different variants made by different companies. In order to 
present accurate data and factual claims, the Freedom Class LCS constructed by Lockheed Martin will be 
the Class specifications used when referring to the “LCS”; however, when referencing any monetary 
claims, the assumption will be that the U.S. Navy purchases 28 Freedom Class and 27 Independence Class 
produced by General Dynamics. 
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then procure other mission packages for other types of missions.”160 This suggests that 
the LCS could eventually find it is in a similar situation as that of the U.S. Navy’s DDGs, 
where the ship loses efficiency (and arguably proficiency) by becoming more of a “multi-
tool.” For example, in Operation Iraqi Freedom Aegis destroyers and cruisers were tasked 
with protecting Iraqi oil platforms in the North Arabian Gulf due to the large role oil 
plays in Iraq’s gross domestic product. However, one could argue that much less 
expensive platforms could accomplish this mission. A ship with capabilities more aligned 
to the HD/HS mission will be more suited to perform those missions, whereas ships with 
broader capabilities will consequently have broader tasking thereby decreasing crew 
proficiency in their primary warfare areas and making them less available due to 
increased demand. While the NSC shares some similarities with the LCS it also has some 
differences that make it not only more aligned with A Cooperative Strategy for 21st 
Century Seapower but also more capable in the HD/HS role (see Figure 6).161 
This option suggests reducing LCS acquisition from 53 to 28 and purchasing 20 
naval variants of the NSC.162 The acquisition costs would decrease from $33.1 to $27.8 
billion and despite the NSC having a longer life-cycle of five years, the total life-cycle 
costs would be reduced from $65.9 to 60.3 billion.163 
1. Advantages 
The endurance and range of the NSC significantly reduces its dependency on 
refueling demands, which enables it to operate with less of a logistical tether to a supply 
ship (see Figure 7).164 Because of the reduced dependency on refueling and endurance of 
60 days, the NSC is a more capable platform for maritime security and humanitarian 
                                                 
160 Congressional Budget Office, “Options for Combining the Navy’s and the Coast Guard’s Small 
Combatant Programs,” July 2009: 8. 
161 Ibid., 15 
162 The cost of a naval variant NSC was determined by adding additional anti-ship missile defense 
systems (SeaRAM Mk-15 Close-In Weapons System and Evolved Sea Sparrow Missiles), source: 
Congressional Budget Office, “Options for Combining the Navy’s and the Coast Guard’s Small Combatant 
Programs”: 18. 
163 Congressional Budget Office, “Options for Combining the Navy’s and the Coast Guard’s Small 
Combatant Programs”: 3. 
164 Ibid., 19 
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operations. The NSC is also capable of providing berthing for an additional 30 personnel, 
allowing it to house other members of a joint task force, sea-borne immigrants and 
evacuees in an HA/DR operation.  
2. Disadvantages 
The U.S. Navy is partially comprised of a surface fleet of warships. Not only do 
warships need to be able to possess an offensive capability, they must also be able to 
defend themselves which includes being able to absorb an attack from the enemy. 
Although the specific actions taken are classified, the U.S. Navy “has designed (the LCS) 
to sustain some degree of damage during combat…and still remain afloat.”165 Although 
one could argue that the Close-in Weapon System and Evolved Sea Sparrow Missile 
provide an effective defense of the naval variant NCS and that because the naval variant 
of the NCS has the same surface warfare capability as the LCS it can serve as a warship 
in the right role. Because the LCS has a shallower draft, it can go further inland than the 
NCS and because it can operate at faster speeds its response time is reduced and time is 









                                                 
165 Congressional Budget Office, “Options for Combining the Navy’s and the Coast Guard’s Small 
Combatant Programs”: 11. 
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Figure 7.   Fuel Constraints: NSC vs. LCS. 
E. OPTION E: RESTRUCTURE SURFACE FORCES 
The U.S. Navy currently operates in a construct that places great emphasis as well 
as some reliance on the use of CSGs. Although the need to research the vulnerability of 
the CVN is for another study, this option suggests decreasing the quantity of required 
escorts for CVNs and establishing HD and HS surface action groups (SAGs). That is to 
say, that this option proposes that the U.S. Navy increase the use of, and reliance on, 
ships typically filling the role of CVN escort employing them in smaller groups of two 
and three, thereby maximizing their capabilities while simultaneously reducing the 
requirements for escorting the CVN. A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower 
places more emphasis on maritime security, humanitarian assistance and disaster 
response and the U.S. Navy can best answer that “call for duty” with HD and HS SAGs. 
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Two main types of SAGs would be used. HS SAGs for the notional “home game” 
and HD SAGs for the more conventional “away game.” The HD SAG would need to be 
capable of strike missions, BMD, HA/DR, SUW and USW. The HS SAG would have 
more emphasis placed on HA/DR and MIO capability in support of maritime security as 
defined in A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower. 
The HD SAG would require two or three DDGs or CGs, one of which must be 
BMD capable. The HD SAG would also have one helicopter squadron detachment 
assigned, which provides the HD SAG SH-60B and SH-60Fs. The SH-60’s increase the 
SAG’s SUW capability by allowing the SAG to engage targets from a distance outside of 
the enemy’s weapons release range. The SH-60s would also help build and maintain a 
recognized maritime picture thereby increasing the SAGs MDA. By having both variants 
of the SH-60, the SAG’s USW capability is increased through the use of sonobuoys, 
magnetic anomaly detector, dipping sonar and could serve as a delivery vehicle for 
torpedoes. 
By not being tasked as CVN escort ships, the HD SAG would be able to operate 
more freely without having to dedicate the resources required to provide screening 
support for the CVN. This will not only make the ships more proficient with more 
fundamental and traditional surface navy operations but also could increase the operating 
range of assets in the SAG providing more freedom of maneuver, which is not only vital 
in combat, but also in other missions and tasking. 
The HS SAG would consist of two to three combatants and one amphibious ship. 
The HS SAG could include a U.S. Coast Guard cutter to reduce law enforcement 
restrictions when the HS SAG is conducting maritime security operations such as 
boarding and searching ships not in international waters. If a U.S. Coast Guard cutter is 
unavailable, the U.S. Navy ships can provide the logistical requirements needed to berth a 
U.S. Coast Guard boarding team.167The HS SAG would require one rotary wing 
detachment to serve as a SAR asset in the HA/DR role and to build and maintain a 
recognized maritime picture improving the SAG’s MDA thereby making the SAG more 
                                                 
167 U.S. Coast Guard boarding team detachments embarking on U.S. Navy ships is a common practice 
and is most commonly used when conducting counter -narcoterrorism (CNT) operations in South America. 
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effective when patrolling in support of maritime security. While most amphibious ships 
have a boarding capability, the ship’s main purpose in the HS SAG is to support 
displaced persons or refugees in the event of a HA/DR mission. 
1. Advantages 
Reducing CVN escort requirements would enable ships to either remain in port, 
saving money through a reduction in operating expenses and would allow more time for 
ship maintenance, or availability for tasking in a HS or HD SAG. This would expand the 
U.S. Navy’s range of operations, geographically and in quantity, which is vital for 
success with the current range of military operations. Ultimately, this option could reduce 
costs and would increase the U.S. Navy’s HS capability. 
2. Disadvantages 
Navy traditionalists may consider this particular option a drastic change in the 
U.S. Navy’s task force organization. Carrier Strike Group commanders and naval 
traditionalists would more than likely not welcome an idea that involves a reduction in 
assigned escort ships. Nominally a CVN has five escort ships to combat threats against 
the CVN; however one must ask, “is there really a threat?” A legitimate threat has to 
have capability, opportunity and intent. Currently, there is no credible intent to harm a 
U.S. Navy aircraft carrier. Regardless, it is sound to anticipate pushback on an idea that 
drifts from the norm. 
3. Conclusion 
From least to most drastic, five options or alternatives have been discussed in this 
section. All of the options remain flexible and could be modified in order to eliminate 
specific shortcomings to more general concerns such as cost, C2 ability, mission burden, 
feasibility and capability. The options can also be merged to create new alternatives, 
option A and C for example. Adding a homeland security certification in the SFTM could 
very well work hand in hand with the establishment of a HDSG. 
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V. CONCLUSION AND FINDINGS 
A. NORTHCOM DEMAND FOR MARITIME CAPABILITY 
Critical infrastructure in the United States continues to age and degrade and 
incidents like the Minneapolis I-35 bridge collapse will likely occur more often. Disasters 
involving nuclear power plants, oil refineries, power grids, dams and other susceptible 
infrastructure could very well occur more frequently. Terrorists continue to plot against 
the United States and climate change continues to cultivate weather irregularities. All of 
these challenges make it more likely that the DoD entity in place to respond to these 
threats and to help manage the consequences of these events, NORTHCOM, will be 
called to action. An undeniable increase of events occurring in NORTHCOM’s area of 
responsibility requires a capability-based response. For the maritime domain, this 
response will be shared by the U.S. Coast Guard and the U.S. Navy. 
To a great extent, NORTHCOM relies on the U.S. Coast Guard for maritime 
defense of the homeland. The U.S. Coast Guard has eleven missions which are divided 
between homeland security statutory missions: ports, waterways, and coastal security 
(PWCS), defense readiness and migrant interdiction; and non-homeland security statutory 
missions: drug interdiction, aids to navigation, search and rescue, living marine sources, 
marine safety, marine environmental protection, law enforcement and ice operations.168  
As a result of the Homeland and Security Act of 2002, the Commandant of the 
U.S. Coast Guard designated Ports, Waterways and Coastal Security (PWCS) as the 
Coast Guard’s primary focus coupled with search and rescue.169 The PWCS mission 
involves: 
(T)he protection of the U.S. Maritime Domain and the U.S. Marine 
Transportation System (MTS) and those who live, work or recreate near 
them; the prevention and disruption of terrorist attacks, sabotage, 
                                                 
168 United States Government Accountability Office, COAST GUARD: Observations on the Fiscal 
Year 2010 Budget and Related Performance and Management Challenges. July 2009: 6. 
169 United States Coast Guard, Office of Counterterrorism and Defense Operations; available from 
http://www.uscg.mil/hq/cg5/cg532/pwcs.asp. 
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espionage, or subversive acts; and response to and recovery from those 
that do occur.  Conducting PWCS deters terrorists from using or 
exploiting the MTS as a means for attacks on U.S. territory, population 
centers, vessels, critical infrastructure, and key resources.  PWCS includes 
the employment of awareness activities; counterterrorism, antiterrorism, 
preparedness and response operations; and the establishment and oversight 
of a maritime security regime.  PWCS also includes the national defense 
role of protecting military outload operations.170 
 
However, as more emphasis has been placed on PWCS, the defense readiness mission 
has been neglected. The Coast Guard considers defense readiness as “participating with 
the Department of Defense in global military operations (and) deploying cutters and other 
boats in and around harbors to protect (DoD) force mobilization operations.”171 A 2009 
Government Accountability Office report on the Coast Guard states, “(T)he Coast Guard 
reported falling substantially short of its performance target for only one mission – 
defense readiness.”172 The report further states, “(I)t has been noted by Congress and 
supported by our past reviews that the Coast Guard faces significant challenges in 
assessing personnel needs and providing a workforce to meet the increased tempo of 
maritime security missions.”173 This suggests that the U.S. Coast Guard is struggling to 
operate with its current missions and tasking and would most likely fail to perform at 
optimum standards with an increased operational tempo. The likely solution will be to 
look to the U.S. Navy as the capable alternative and in turn increase naval operational 
tempo as needed. 
 
                                                 
170 United States Government Accountability Office, COAST GUARD: Observations on the Fiscal 
Year 2010 Budget and Related Performance and Management Challenges. July 2009: 6. 
171 Ibid., 6. 
172 Ibid., 15. Defense readiness for the Coast Guard was 76% in 2004 and has steadily declined to this 
date: 27. 
173 Ibid., 18. 
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B. NORTHCOM’S INCREASED ROLE AS A RESULT OF CLIMATE 
CHANGE 
Regardless of the cause, the idea of climate change has become generally 
accepted in the world of academia. Changes in humidity, precipitation, winds, seasons 
and temperature create an environment that causes more dangerous and frequent weather 
patterns that can result in more intense and therefore more destructive hurricanes. The 
fact that over one half of the United States’ population currently resides in coastal 
counties (and growing) coupled with over 80 percent of the world’s trade being 
conducted by the maritime domain combine to make the United States’ 95,000 mile 
coastline vulnerable not only to man-made disasters but violent acts of nature as well.174 
In September 2009, the weather in the Pacific Ocean produced a deadly combination of 
tropical cyclones, earthquakes and tsunamis, some of which occurred in close succession 
within a 24-hour period. One might ask, how well could the local, state and federal 
government respond if California experienced its feared “great quake” in the north while 
experiencing a hurricane in the south?  
Climate change is not only affecting the United States’ coastline, it is also 
creating a dilemma for the DoD in the Arctic region. The Arctic region is of significance 
because as the continental ice shelf continues to melt (see Figure 8) more resources 
become available. It is estimated that up to 30 percent of the world’s undiscovered gas 
and 13 percent of oil, as well as other natural minerals, lie in the Arctic. As the waters 
continue to warm, fish will migrate to the Arctic furthering the value of the region. 
Natural and biological resources as well as maritime shipping routes make the Arctic 
region a lucrative prospect that appeals to a number of nation states. There are five 
countries surrounding the Arctic: the United States (via Alaska), Canada, Russia, Norway 
and Denmark (via Greenland). The United States, Canada and the western side of 
Greenland fall into NORTHCOM’s AOR (see Figure 9). Currently, there are two ocean 
straits in the Arctic region, one of which is in NORTHCOM’s AOR. Besides 
“ownership” of the Bering Strait, NORTHCOM also has the Northern Nares Strait in its 
                                                 
174Department of Defense, The National Strategy for Maritime Security and National Oceanic 
Service; available from http://oceanservice.noaa.gov/programs/mb/supp_cstl_population.html. 
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AOR. The Northern Nares Strait is anticipated to evolve into a third entrance/exit to the 
Arctic, charging NORTHCOM with oversight of two-thirds of the critical oceanic 
chokepoints in the region. The potential USA continental shelf lies within 
NORTHCOM’s AOR (see Figure 10). The shelf is the most important geographic space 
with respect to natural resources, oil, natural gas, methane hydrate, minerals and marine 
species and is clearly physically located within NORTHCOM’s AOR. 
The Arctic region will likely become at minimum, a rich resource area of strategic 
importance to the U.S. and at worst a potential area of conflict. NORTHCOM could very 
well find the Arctic added to its AOR increasing their geographic responsibilities and 
mission requirements. The problems that come with the benefits of the Arctic are just 
around the corner. These particular challenges will place a significant stress on the 
NORTHCOM’s maritime ability and these challenges added to the others discussed in 
this study would only further strengthen the argument that NORTHCOM have a full-time 













                                                 
175 More polar bear are going hungry — but is that the biggest concern? January 13, 2009, Larvatus 










Figure 9.   NORTHCOM AOR in the Arctic.176 
 
                                                 




Figure 10.   Potential U.S. Continental Shelf.177 
C. RECOMMENDATION 
Maritime activity in NORTHCOM’s AOR will most likely increase in the future 
and the U.S. Coast Guard may not be able to effectively handle the tasking. It is 
imperative that the U.S. Navy provide the most efficient, effective and competent means 
available to NORTHCOM in order to support this increased tasking in order to maximize 
security and minimize suffering to the American people. 
In Chapter IV, five alternative options to the current construct were discussed 
along with their relative advantages and disadvantages. Figure 11 illustrates each option’s 
                                                 
177 Maritime jurisdiction and boundaries in the Arctic region December 13, 2008, Durham University; 
available from http://www.dur.ac.uk/ibru/resources/arctic/. 
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effectiveness in five categories: cost, mission burden, C2, feasibility and capability. Each 
option was compared to current means and received an “effectiveness score” (1: less 
effective, 2: indifferent and 3: more effective) for each category based on that 
comparison.178 When assigning an effectiveness score the following questions were 
asked: 
• Cost: How significant would the financial burden be with the implementation of 
this option (the less expensive the more effective)?  
• Mission burden: How much additional burden would be placed on surface forces 
(the less burden the more effective the option)? 
• C2 Ability: How much quicker would the potential response time be based on a 
streamlined chain of command and how well does this option afford 
NORTHCOM to effectively execute C2 with minimal interference from 
additional commands (the better the C2 and quicker the time response the more 
effective the option)? 
• Feasibility: How feasible is the implementation of this option (the more feasible 
the more effective the option)? 
• Capability: How capable is this option in providing support to the Homeland 
Security mission (the more capable the more effective the option)? 
Each category was given a relative weight in order to place the appropriate amount of 
emphasis on that category. For numerical simplicity, each category was given a value in 
one-fifth increments. Cost received a weight of one-fifth based on a cost/benefit analysis; 
preventing damage and minimizing human suffering largely outweighs a relatively small 
price tag. Mission burden received two-fifths relative weight because ultimately, good 
leaders and managers who practice effective planning are capable of taking on more tasks 
and if a burden too large was placed on the U.S. Navy it could adapt via an increase in 
ships and personnel. C2 was assigned a relative weight of three-fifths because it places 
particular emphasis on the timely response of U.S. Navy assets and the ability to control 
those assets once on station; effective C2 can make or break the success of an operation. 
Feasibility received a relative weight of four-fifths because it is important to identify if a 
                                                 
178 An intercoder reliability analysis was conducted by a retired U.S. Navy captain from the surface 
warfare community with a background in operational research.  Captain Jeffery Kline was not familiar with 
my thesis, only the options provided in Chapter IV. The result of the analysis suggests that my assessments 
avoided any potential bias and analysis of the options can be considered as generally sound. 
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particular option is even possible, the more difficult to implement an option the less 
likely it would be put into practice. Capability received a weight of one because, 
ultimately, the effectiveness of the option is the most important attribute against which 















Option A 3 3 2 3 2 7.4 
Option B 2 1 3 3 3 8 
Option C 1 1 3 2 3 7 
Option D 3 2 3 1 3 7 
Option E 2 2 3 2 3 7.6 
 
Figure 11.   Analysis of Options. 
Option B, “Assets assigned to NORTHCOM” received an overall score of 8, 
which was the highest score of the five options.179 This is not to say that assigning assets 
to NORTHCOM will make the U.S. Navy the most proficient or effective military branch 
in the HS arena, but that by assigning assets to NORTHCOM there would be minimal 
financial impact, improved C2 is achievable, and overall it would provide an improved 
capability compared to current means. 
It is interesting to note that Option D, “National Security Cutter (NSC) 
acquisition” only received one “less effective” grade, which prevented it from receiving 
the highest computed score as well as the overall recommendation. The fact that the mark 
of less effective was in the feasibility category suggests that issues with resistance and 
change may outweigh concerns of performance and capability in the U.S. Navy. 
                                                 
179 For example: Option B (.2 x 2(cost) + .4 x 1(mission burden) + .6 x 3 (C2) + .8 x 3 (feasibility) + 1 
x 3 (capability) = 8). 
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D. FURTHER RESEARCH 
As time continues to advance so does NORTHCOM’s operational tempo. This 
will inevitably lead to looking at ways NORTHCOM can become more effective which 
in turn will require analysis of its subordinate and supporting commands. The increase in 
challenges will have to be addressed by more complex and innovative solutions due to 
the uncertainty and unique challenges that comes with the passing of time. Further 
research should be conducted that explores variations or hybrids of the options discussed 
in Chapter IV. For example, Option A and B could potentially be merged and would 
produce HS certified assets assigned to NORTHCOM. Other avenues that could be 
explored include considering new options or alternatives, such as the establishment of a 
U.S. Navy National Guard with surface and aviation assets. Analysis of previous or new 
options using different categories than the ones posed in Figure 11 could provide 
additional insight and potentially lead to improved options or variations of the previously 
identified missions. 
This thesis clarifies the significance and the likely growing dependency on 
NORTHCOM and it identifies weaknesses with its relationship with the U.S. Navy 
followed by proposing some alternatives that could potentially better serve the COCOM 
in support of accomplishment of their missions. Ultimately, to achieve some sort of 
solution, U.S. Navy leadership would have to acknowledge that deficiencies do exist and 
be willing to alter or modify the current method and means employed. While the exact 
solution may not be clearly identifiable, one key component of it for certain is the need 
for change. 
 
Change is the law of life.  
And those who look only to the past or present are certain to miss the future. 
 — John F. Kennedy 
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